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1Introduction
For celebrities, name and image are, arguably, two of their most valuable assets.  
From headlining a movie, to starring in a commercial, to endorsing a product, a 
celebrity’s persona is potentially worth thousands to millions of dollars.  However, this 
intangible commodity’s worth is often siphoned off by those who appropriate a 
celebrity’s name or image without authorization or remuneration, thus potentially 
decreasing the property’s value.  In order to stifle this unjust enrichment, celebrities 
greatly desire the absolute right to control the commercial exploitation of their name and 
likeness.
Commonly known as the right of publicity, more than half the states in the U.S.1
now recognize, in one form or another, at least a limited right to control the commercial 
exploitation of a “person’s indicia of identity”.2  A relatively recent doctrine, extending 
traditional notions of property rights, the right of publicity was first coined 50 years ago 
by Judge Jerome Frank in the seminal case of Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, defining the right as “the right of a man in the publicity value of his likeness”.3
Since Haelen, the right of publicity body of law has evolved, wholly on the state level, 
through both common law and statutory enactments.  For many states, this protection is 
limited to a person’s name or picture.  Yet for others, led, not surprisingly, by the Ninth 
Circuit, the definitional parameters of protection are broader and more inclusive of traits 
related directly to a celebrity’s persona.  
1
 F. Jay Dougherty, International Right of Publicity Symposium: Forward: The Right of Publicity –
Towards a Comparative and International Perspective, 18 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L.J. 421, 424 (1998).
2 Id. at 423.
3 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2nd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 
346 U.S. 816 (1953).
2Extending protection to a celebrity’s traits came to the forefront of jurisprudence 
20 years ago in the case between legendary crooner Bette Midler and the Ford Motor 
Company.4  Further discussed below, Ford initially offered Midler the opportunity to 
perform one of her songs for an upcoming commercial.  Midler declined the invitation, in 
line with her career-long stance against endorsing products.5  Thereafter, instead of 
obtaining a compulsory license and hiring another singer to record the song for the ad, 
Midler alleged that Ford deliberately engaged one of her former back-up singers to 
imitate Midler’s voice.6  Consequently, those viewing the commercial had the impression 
that Midler was actually the one performing.  Differentiating between Midler and the real 
performer was further tenuous since the song was initially recorded by Midler and had 
achieved considerable fame.7
As a result, Midler sued Ford for violation of her right of publicity under both the 
California statutory code and common law.  Midler argued that Ford had misappropriated 
her likeness and persona by imitating her highly recognizable voice in the commercial.  
Although the court dismissed her statutory claim based on a strict reading of the code’s 
language, they held that she could maintain a claim under the broader common law 
protection that included misappropriation of a celebrity’s “indicia of identity” beyond 
those stipulated in the state statute.8 Midler became a landmark decision in expanding 
the “unique” characteristics over which celebrities retain almost unilateral control.  
4 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).  The original commercials were produced in 
1985.
5 Id. at 461.
6 Id. at 462.
7 Id.
8 See generally Id.
3Since Midler, the Ninth Circuit, as well as most jurisdictions recognizing the right 
of publicity, continues to struggle in establishing definitive boundaries for protecting a 
celebrity’s “likeness” and persona.  While some courts have created an expanded 
definition of protectable characteristics, to incorporate those innately related to the 
celebrity and thus capable of commercial misappropriation, others have retained a 
narrower interpretation, protecting only the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s name and 
image.9  The struggle for a clear and precise definition, in part because of ambiguous 
statutory language and intent, is made all the more complicated due to the lack of a 
federal right of publicity statute.  This lack of harmonization has led many right of 
publicity experts, as well as the American Bar Association to recommend the enactment 
of a federal protection scheme.10  Most experts argue that a federal statute is necessary in 
order to curb significant forum shopping and to provide advertisers and celebrities with 
the precise boundaries of protection.11
Unlike acts wholly contained within a state’s borders, technological innovations 
and the pervasiveness of advertising have no such restrictions.  The same situation exists 
with most products bearing a celebrity’s endorsement.  The continued advancements and 
reach of the Internet, due, in particular, to broadband technology, serves to further 
highlight the borderless world in which parties conduct business.  Consequently, this 
premise underlies the strong call for a national right of publicity.  This article contends 
that a celebrity’s publicity right should not differ between two states in which their 
likeness is misappropriated as a result of the same tortious act.  Ford’s nationwide 
9 See generally, Kevin M. Fisher, Comment, Which Path to Follow: A Comparative Perspective on the 
Right of Publicity, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 95 (2000).
10
 Marci A. Hamilton, et al., Right of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals to 
Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209, 210, 214 (1998).
11 See Id.
4commercial does not only injure Midler in California, the state of residence, but, 
potentially, in all states where her image carries intrinsic value.  Therefore, Midler should 
have a viable remedy in all jurisdictions where she is harmed.  
Although this paper contends that a federal right of publicity is appropriate and 
necessary, it posits that right of publicity protection must now embrace the global 
marketplace through a well-defined international scheme by which persons, celebrities 
and non-celebrities alike may prevent the unauthorized and uncompensated 
commercialization of their name and likeness.  The Internet and satellite television have 
led to the internationalization of advertisements.  Furthermore, the intrinsic value of the 
global “merchandising” of celebrities has by no shortage of the imagination grown 
significantly in the last decade.12  Consequently, akin to the justifications for global 
intellectual property protection, the right of publicity, almost universally recognized as a 
neighboring right to either copyright or trademark, deserves protection within a uniform, 
global framework.  
To that end, this paper draws comparisons between the “right of publicity” 
protection devices, or synonymous laws, of the United States and several major foreign 
marketplaces.  It will also examine the potential existence of such rights under several 
international intellectual property agreements and conventions, while analyzing the 
enforcement mechanisms to potential plaintiffs. 
Part I examines the historical perspectives and justifications for the right of 
publicity within the United States, including an examination of the seminal cases leading 
to the Midler decision.  Part II will discuss the right of publicity laws in the two leading
jurisdictions – California and New York – and how lawmakers and judges in these 
12
 Dougherty, supra note 1, at 421.
5circuits have handed-down vastly divergent right of publicity decisions, leading to 
conflicting protection and, therefore, a lack of national harmonization.  Part III will 
analyze the right of publicity protection, if any, within the laws of several countries 
throughout the world, including the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, and Argentina.  
Finally, Part IV will discuss the potential existence of a right of publicity or, if none 
exists, the need for such protection under current international intellectual property 
treaties.  Part V will examine under which regime of intellectual property law, copyright 
or trademark, does right of publicity protection naturally exists, if either.  Lastly, Part VI 
will put forth a proposed statutory and remedial international protection scheme.  
Part I: The Right of Publicity
A. Right of Publicity Historical Roots
The right of publicity is often described as the “inherent right of every human 
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity”.13  Though related to property 
rights, the doctrine’s origins shed light on protection encompassing both monetary and 
emotional injuries.  In order to understand the contemporary state of the right of publicity 
doctrine, both in the United States and globally, this part discusses the origins and 
rationales for the protection.  
i. Invasion of Privacy Origins
Most scholars posit that the right of publicity doctrine emerged from the tort for 
invasion of privacy.  Sixty years before Haelan, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
authored an oft-cited Harvard Law Review article proposing the idea of a private cause of 
13 Henley v. Dillard Department Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (quoting, J. Thomas 
McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer Symposium: Article: Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A 
Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703, at 1704 (1987)).
6action for invasion of privacy.14  Warren and Brandeis argued that the law needed to 
protect private persons from the harm and embarrassment of the public disclosure of 
private facts by the media, regardless of truth.15
Fifteen years after Warren and Brandeis first introduced the idea for an invasion 
of privacy tort, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Pasevich v. New England Life Insurance 
Co., explicitly recognized the validity of such a claim.16  In addition to the recognition of 
a common law right, under Pasevich,17 several states followed suit and enacted right of 
privacy statutes focusing on the personal dignity of an individual for emotional injuries 
stemming from an invasion of their privacy.18
Decades of precedent and statutory enactments led to a significant body of law 
interpreting the invasion of privacy as protecting against the emotional harms resulting 
from the unauthorized use of one’s identity.19  However, the “privacy” requirement in 
Warren and Brandeis’ article, as well as statutory enactments for invasion of privacy 
posed significant problem for celebrities’ ability to redress claims for the unauthorized 
and unremunerated use of their name or likeness for commercial purposes. 
First, some jurisdictions refused to recognize a common law right of privacy, 
either in its entirety or broad enough to encompass a celebrity’s commercial 
misappropriation claim.20  As discussed in Part II, the highest court in New York,21 as 
14 See, Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)
15 Joshua Waller, Comment, The Right of Publicity: Preventing the Exploitation of a Celebrity’s Identity or 
Promoting the Exploitation of the First Amendment?, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 59, 60 (2001) (citing Warren 
& Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)).  
16 Pasevich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190 (1905)
17 See Id.
18
 Waller, supra note 15, at 60.
19 Id.; Ashley D. Hayes, Note, The Right of Publicity and Protection of Persona: Preemption Not Required, 
51 SYR. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2001).
20 See, Paul Cirino, Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and California, 39 N.Y.L. 
SCHOOL L. REV. 763, 771-778 (1994).
7early as 1901, explicitly stated that a common law right of privacy did not exist.  The 
state’s legislature quickly enacted a statutory remedy making it a misdemeanor to use the 
name or portrait of any person for advertising purposes without their authorization.22
Though an appropriate corrective measure to the court’s decision, subsequent New York 
decisions have not only narrowly defined the parameters of protection under the statute, 
but courts have used the statute’s enactment as further proof that a common law right of 
publicity, under the rubric of a privacy law, does not exist.23  As this article will discuss, 
the California court’s recognition of a common law publicity right, protecting attributes 
beyond those explicitly enumerated in the statutory code, proved vital in providing 
Midler, and similarly-situated plaintiffs, a proper and redressable claim. 
The other major historical hurdle for a celebrity’s invocation of a state’s invasion 
of privacy law was that most courts interpreted the statute narrowly, thus requiring 
plaintiff’s to prove that they were indeed private individuals.  Courts reasoned that since 
the claims were for an invasion of privacy, protecting the emotional wounds and 
embarrassment of being thrust into the public eye, only private persons could claim an 
unauthorized use of their name and likeness in commerce.24  Most courts held that a 
remedy for the tort was only available to those individuals who had not willingly placed 
themselves in the public eye.25
Therefore, since celebrities were already in the “public eye”, courts held that there 
could be no invasion of privacy.  In essence, celebrities had forgone the right to retain a 
21 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902).
22
 Cirino, supra note 20, at 771-772.
23 See Id. at 771-774. 
24 PETER B. MAGGS & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 614, 622 (Sixth 
ed. West Group 2002) (1950); J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer Symposium: Article: Melville B. 
Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. R EV. 1703, 1705-1706 (1987).
25 MAGGS & SCHECHTER, supra note 24, at 622.
8private life, apart from the public one.  Further complicating the matter was the fact that 
courts were unwilling to differentiate between the usual claims for an invasion of privacy 
by a private individual – embarrassment and indignity – and those pertaining to 
celebrities – commercial misappropriation.  
Celebrities were not arguing that the invasion was unwelcome, but simply that the 
publicity was uncompensated.26  Yet, courts were adamantly unwilling to entertain this 
contention, even going as far as implying that a celebrity’s “greed” did not deserve 
judicially endorsed monetary protection.  In particular, the Fifth Circuit, later a strong 
protector of the right of publicity, rejected a famous athlete’s invasion of privacy claim, 
when his picture was used in an advertising calendar for beer, stating that “the publicity 
he got was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving.”27
Although the Fifth Circuit was unwilling to encapsulate a celebrity’s remunerative 
claim under the invasion of privacy argument, several commentators began to endorse the 
validity of such a cause of action.  As one of the foremost legal commentators on the 
right of publicity J. Thomas McCarthy expressed:
Privacy law seemed unable to accommodate the view that human identity 
constituted an intellectual property right with commercial value measured by 
supply and demand in the advertising and promotion marketplace.  The situation 
was ripe for a break in traditional thinking.28
This break in traditional thought came to fruition in the form of the Haelen decision, as 
well as a highly acclaimed article by William Prosser.
26
 Waller, supra note 15, at 60.
27
 O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, at 170 (5th Cir. 1941).
28
 J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer Symposium: Article: Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of 
Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703, at 1706 (1987).
9ii. Property Law Origins
Half a century of statutory law and jurisprudence, since Warren and Brandeis first 
introduced the concept of a tort for the invasion of privacy, a developed body of law, 
wholly on the state level, had become significant, yet disorganized.  Under this 
landscape, Professor Prosser posited that the concept of privacy law - the right to be let 
alone - actually encompassing four distinct torts:
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
(3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
(4) Appropriation, for defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.29
Prosser further defined the fourth tort as the “exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff’s 
identity.”30
Written several years after the Haelan decision, Prosser’s argument unequivocally 
relied on Judge Frank’s recognition of a right of publicity rooted in property law.  
Defining the right of publicity as “the right of a man in the publicity of his likeness”, 
Judge Frank explained that:
Many prominent persons…far from having their feelings bruised through public 
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received 
money for authorizing advertisements…This right of publicity would usually 
yield no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which 
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.31
Interestingly, Judge Frank’s opinion echoed the celebrities’ contention for protection 
under privacy laws, not for potential public indignity, but for the commercial and 
uncompensated misappropriation of their name or likeness.  The Haelan decision’s 
endorsement of a viable right of publicity claim under property law found further 
29
 William M. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 385 (1960).
30 Id. at 383.
31 Haelen, 202 F.2d 866, at 868.
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endorsement the following year in renowned intellectual property scholar Melville 
Nimmer.  Nimmer postulated that there exists “the right of each person to control the 
profit from the publicity values which he has created or purchased.”32
Nimmer’s argument recognized an independent, common law right protecting 
economic rather than the personal, emotional interests associated with the right of 
privacy.  Underlied with property law principles, Nimmer reasoned that significant 
commercial value exists in a celebrity’s name or likeness because of the considerable 
time, money and effort expended in building such value.33  Consequently, in conformity 
with John Locke’s labor theory, something of value is entitled to the fruits of its 
economic gain.  In short, celebrities, and arguably non-celebrities alike, should be given 
the exclusive right to prevent the unauthorized commercial misappropriation of their 
name and likeness.
The California Supreme Court, in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,34 decided one 
year after Prosser’s article, further embedded in jurisprudence the existence of a common 
law right of publicity as rooted in property law.  In Lugosi, the plaintiff-heirs of famed 
actor Bela Lugosi sought to recover profits from Universal for its licensing of the Count 
Dracula character in subsequent films.35  Lugosi, aside from portraying the protagonist 
Dracula, had produced the original motion picture in 1931.  The plaintiff’s argued under a 
right of publicity claim that Universal had misappropriated Lugosi’s likeness to 
merchandise Count Dracula.36  Relying almost entirely on Prosser’s article, the court not 
only held that Lugosi indeed had a proprietary interest in his likeness, but since the 
32
 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203, at 216 (1954).
33 See Id.
34 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
35 Id. at 427.
36 Id.
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protection was linked to property law, it was descendible, thereby giving his heirs 
standing to bring forth a colorable claim.37
Following Lugosi, several circuits endorsed this property law based rationale for a 
right of publicity.  Naturally, along with this justification came the proverbial “bundle of 
rights” associated with property, including exclusivity, assignability and descendability.  
The Georgia Supreme Court further integrated the right of publicity’s existence as a 
property right in a highly regarded case involving Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.38  In that 
decision, the court differentiated between what it perceived as two distinct causes of 
action with independent elements and rights.  It held that the invasion of privacy is a 
personal tort that cannot be assigned or inherited.39  Meanwhile, the right of publicity, 
now viewed under the rubric of property law, could generally be assigned and 
bequeathed. 
Subsequent decisions also helped further define the parameters of this protection.  
The Sixth Circuit, in Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets,40 stated that a celebrity’s 
identity is valuable in the promotion of goods and therefore he “has an interest that may 
be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”41
Furthermore, the Carson court decided not to limit the claim as to whether a name or 
likeness was misappropriated but whether the celebrity’s identity was commercially 
exploited.  In short, the celebrity has the “exclusive legal right to control and profit from 
the commercial use of their name, personality, and identity.”42
37 Id. at 428-429.
38 Martin Luther King Jr. Center For Social Change v. American Heritage Products, 250 Ga. 135 (1982).
39 Id. at 143-144.
40 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
41 Id. at 834.  (“If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right 
whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used.”)
42 Henley, 46 F.Supp.2d 587, at 590. (citing Carson, 698 F.2d 831)
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As this article will discuss, though Carson provided broad protection, several 
states have either narrowly defined protectable indicia or have altogether negated its 
existence under common law.  First, the Fifth Circuit, in Matthews v. Wozencraft, though 
recognizing the right of publicity, explicitly stated that the “tort does not protect the use 
of a celebrity’s name per se, but rather the value associated with the name.”43  This 
decision implicitly coincides with First Amendment proponents who worry that 
extending right of publicity protection beyond purely commercial uses will erode 
freedom of speech protection.44  Second, as discussed above, several jurisdictions refuse 
to recognize a common law right of publicity.  Fueling the call for a federal statute, 
explicitly enumerating protected indicia of identity, these states rely wholly on 
conflicting statutory language, regardless of the fact that the injury is identical in all 
jurisdictions in which the celebrity is exploited.  
The Matthews case also illustrates that right of publicity claims and sought-after 
remedies are perhaps better viewed as a blend between the two regimes – privacy law and 
property law.  To that end, the court relied heavily on the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
652C, which wholly incorporated Prosser’s fourth “privacy” tort: One who appropriates 
to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of privacy.45  Interestingly, though the Matthews court, like many modern 
decisions, uses the rhetoric of “privacy”, they normally grant relief for economic rather 
than emotional injuries.46
43 Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, at 437 (5th Cir. 1994).
44 See generally, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity v. the First Amendment: A Property and 
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994).
45 Matthews, 15 F.3d at 437. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(C) (1977)).
46 MAGGS & SCHECHTER, supra note 24, at 623.
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B. Right of Publicity Justifications
As described above, the right of publicity has gone from unrecognized at the turn 
of the 20th Century, to finding its roots through an expanded interpretation of “privacy” 
law, to protecting, not only name and likeness, but, additional traits of a celebrity’s 
persona.  Along this evolution from a privacy-based tort to a tort under property law, 
scholars and courts have provided numerous justifications for the existence and 
expansion of the right of publicity.  The Tenth Circuit summarized the justifications to 
include: (1) providing an incentive for creativity and achievement; (2) maintaining some 
value to the commercial use of one’s identity by prohibiting commercial exploitation; (3) 
preventing consumer confusion; (4) allowing celebrities to enjoy the fruits of their labors; 
(5) preventing unjust enrichment; and (6) preventing emotional injuries.47
Though some rationales exist in foreign similar protection schemes, others are 
unequivocally contained wholly within the American legal framework.  In addition, as 
explained below and central to this paper’s argument for an international harmonization 
for right of publicity protection, these justifications seemingly mirror those proffered for 
intellectual property rights.
i. Economic Justifications
Much legal doctrine in the United States centers on economic justifications for 
protecting private rights.  For example, and closely related to the right of publicity, one of 
the common arguments for expansive copyright protection is that it will further the 
underlying purpose of the United States Constitution and the 1976 Federal Copyright Act 
in encouraging the creation of original and derivative works.  
47 Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 973-76 (10th Cir. 1996).
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This economic approach is a central justification for the right of publicity because 
it encapsulates: protection of market value, economic incentive, and the internalization of 
externalities.  One of the basic assertions involves protection of the celebrity’s market 
value.  Proponents contend that since a celebrity’s identity is most valuable to him, he is 
the entity most likely to conserve its value by fervently policing its use.  In essence, 
celebrities can only protect the market value of their identity when self-interested 
entrepreneurs are prevented from exploiting it.48  For example, if Michael Jordan’s image 
has a $1 million value, a manufacturer should not have the right to use his image, thereby 
receiving significant financial benefit through the siphoning of Michael Jordan’s 
goodwill, without express consent and adequate remuneration.  If people were granted 
such unfettered use, the value of Jordan’s image would be wholly negated.  
Manufacturers would either use the image without paying the fair market value, or if they 
decided to compensation Jordan, they would almost certainly not pay the true value, $1 
million.  As a result, Jordan must have the unilateral right to sell his image, en masse, in 
order to protect its value.      
Another raison d’etre, as discussed in the only quasi-right of publicity decision 
handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court, centers on a policy rationale strikingly similar 
to intellectual property justifications.49  In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
the plaintiff sued after the defendant filmed his entire “human cannonball” act and, 
despite his objections, broadcast the footage, in toto, on the nightly news.50  Finding for 
Zacchini, the Court held that protecting such a right would motivate the performer to 
48
 Dawn H. Dawson, Note, The Final Frontier: Right of Publicity in Fictional Characters, 2001 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 635, 656 (2001)
49
 Fisher, supra note 9, at 99.
50 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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“make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.”51  The 
Court reasoned that without such protection, the performer would have no economic 
incentive to further his craft.  In the end, the public benefits by allowing individuals to 
reap the rewards of their hard work.52
The Court was concerned that advertisers could free ride on the celebrity’s self-
created good will, unless the right to appropriate such value was held solely by the 
work’s creator.53  Although not specifically mentioned in the case itself, this notion is 
synonymous with right of publicity rationales recognizing the need to protect individuals 
who had created value in their name and likeness.  Furthermore, it would encourage 
creativity and effort because individuals would wholly control the commercial 
exploitation of this self-created value.54
The final economic justification, considers the internalization of externalities.  
Proponents posit that by viewing the right of publicity as a bundle of property rights 
efficiency is promoted because it concentrates in the owner all the costs and benefits 
associated with a particular activity.  As a result, the owner will fully internalize all 
related social costs and in doing so will defeat any externalities potentially created by 
third parties.55
To best illustrate this argument, imagine that Harrison Ford decides to join the 
National Rifle Association and is asked to promote the NRA through a series of 
commercial ads.  Following the campaign, there is public outcry over his association and 
51 Id. at 577.
52 Id. at 576.
53
 Hayes, supra note 19, at 1058.
54 Id.
55
 Vincent M. de Grandpre, Article, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Economic Analysis of the 
Right of Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 91-92 (2001).
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the value of his image is significantly reduced.  Ford, therefore, will have to fully endure 
and internalize the costs of his own decisions.  On the flip side, if he associates himself 
with the National Breast Cancer Awareness Association and his image’s value increases 
significantly, he reaps the rewards from that decision.  Unjustifiable externalities occur 
when Ford’s value is either increased or decreased due to actions of someone else whom 
free rides off of the celebrity’s good will.  For example, if the NRA places Ford in an ad 
campaign without his authorization and as a result his value decreases, he is forced to 
internalize consequences of externalities.  Therefore, proponents argue that such 
internalization promotes inefficiency because an extraneous step – NRA’s unauthorized 
use of Ford’s image – occurs in affecting the value of a celebrity’s image.56
ii. Moral Justifications
Courts have also justified the right of publicity from a moral perspective.  In 
McFarland v. E & K Corp., the court held that “[a] celebrity’s identity, embodied in his 
name, likeness, and other personal characteristics, is the ‘fruit of his labor’ and becomes a 
type of property entitled to legal protection.”57  This argument, also tied to Locke’s labor 
theory, stands for the basic proposition that if a person labors over a piece of property, 
thereby creating or increasing its value, that person must have the right to use that 
property as he sees fit.  Permitting a party to capitalize on someone else’s labor would 
lead to morally reprehensible unjust enrichment.58
56 Id.
57 McFarland v. E. & K. Corp., Civil No. 4-89-727, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1496, at *4 (D. Minn. 1991) 
(citing Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970))
58 See Fisher, supra note 9, at 98.
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In advancing this proposition, courts have justified morally-based protection by 
again differentiating and balancing between publicity and privacy rights.59  Celebrities 
can’t sue for the disclosure of embarrassing facts, but can for the misappropriation of 
their identity to the economic advantage of another since they labored over their identity 
in passing from the status of a private person to one of a celebrity.  While a private 
person remains at that status without any work, a celebrity must labor over his identity 
and craft in order to achieve his “public” status and that labor must be protected against 
unjust enrichment.  
Courts also realize that a violation of this right results in a commercial injury to 
the business value of one’s personal identity.  In short, someone who has created 
something of value is entitled to the fruits of his economic gain without the diminution of 
that value by someone who was not instrumental in creating it.60  As a result, the law 
attempts to avert the situation where in one fell swoop an intruder uses a celebrity’s 
identity to his commercial advantage while simultaneously wholly ruining that overall 
value, making years of hard work null and void.  To that end, some posit that moral 
justifications do have some roots in privacy values, affording an individual the right to 
associate himself with people and products of his choosing.  The unauthorized use of a 
celebrity’s name or image offends this interest because the appropriation is without the 
celebrity’s approval.61
With these moral and economic justifications in mind, damages for infringement 
are calculated according to the fair market value of the plaintiff’s identity, unjust 
59
 See Jennifer Y. Choi, Comment, No Room for Cheers: Schizophrenic Application in the Realm of Right 
of Publicity Protection, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 121, 134 (2002).
60
 Waller, supra note 15, at 61-62.
61
 See Fisher, supra note 9, at 98.
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enrichment, the infringer’s profits, and damage to the plaintiff’s identity.62  Although 
these remedies are an important step in protecting the celebrity’s value, such 
misappropriation may never make the celebrity whole, and in so doing fully regaining the 
value of their image and name.  Their years of labor will perhaps forever be tarnished 
quite like a private individual’s reputation muddied through the dissemination of
embarrassing information.
iii. Consumer Protection Justifications and the Lanham Act
The final justification for the right of publicity focuses on “consumer protection”, 
promoting the notion that an enforceable right of publicity will “protect consumers from 
deceptive trade practices.”63  Obviously the purpose of using a celebrity in an 
advertisement is to increase sales of the product since consumers will immediately 
associate the product with the celebrity.  As a result, if the celebrity has created an 
appreciable degree of good-will, the consumer may be more apt to trust the product’s 
quality.  This value explains why companies pay the likes of Tiger Woods, Michael 
Jordan and George Foreman millions of dollars to endorse their products.  The consumer 
protection argument contends that if infringers are allowed to falsely associate a trusted 
celebrity’s name or image with their product, consumers will mistakenly assume that the 
celebrity endorsement assures a certain quality.  Such misappropriation could propel 
consumers to buy sub-par products and, in the end, hurt the celebrity’s value because of 
the inevitable tarnishment to their goodwill.
62
 Scott L. Whiteleather, Article, Rebels With a Cause: Artists’ Struggles to Escape a Place Where 
Everybody Owns Your Name, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 253, 273 (2001).
63
 Waller, supra note 15, at 62.
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In order to protect consumers, federal law specifically §43(a) of the Lanham Act 
prohibits any actions which may lead to confusion as to a product’s origin.  Section 43(a) 
provides that: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services…uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact which –
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or;
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristic, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to 
be damaged by such act.64
In a § 43(a) false endorsement action, with facts similar to those underlying 
Midler, Tom Waits, a famous folk singer, sued for the commercial misappropriation of 
his voice through the use of an imitator.  In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,65 the defendant 
propositioned Waits to perform one of his songs for a commercial.  However, Waits had 
always maintained a no endorsement policy and, therefore, rejected the offer.  Insisting 
on using the song, the advertising company hired a singer to not only perform the song 
but actually imitate Waits’ voice and persona.  According to the facts, people were not 
able to differentiate between the imitator and Waits.66  The court, relying heavily on 
Midler, applied a right of publicity analysis and held that, “When a distinctive voice of a 
64
 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
65 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
66 Id. at 1097-1098.
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professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, 
the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs.”67  Consequently, when a celebrity’s 
voice is sufficient to identify him, his voice is protected against its unauthorized imitation 
for commercial purposes.  
Analyzing legislative history, the court stated that Congress was particularly 
interested in protecting consumers from deception through false association and false 
advertising.68  Accordingly, it broadly interpreted the terms listed in §43(a) to include 
distinctive sounds and physical appearance.  As a result, the court upheld the plaintiff’s 
claim that the song and, particularly, how it was performed misrepresented his 
association with, and endorsement of, the product.69
 The court acknowledged separate injury to Waits’ future publicity value 
(economic injury), as well as his goodwill (reputational injury) and awarded damages for 
each stating “the appropriation of the identity of a celebrity may induce humiliation, 
embarrassment, and mental distress.”70  In addition, the opinion upheld the invocation of 
the Lanham Act as a proper vehicle against both misappropriation and deceptive 
advertising practices.71
Though §43(a) does provide a certain level of protection against the unauthorized 
commercial misappropriation of a celebrity’s name or likeness, it is important to note that 
significant differences exist between it and the right of publicity.  First, in order to prevail 
in a 43(a) action, the plaintiff must demonstrate a sufficient quantum of consumer 
confusion.  On the other hand, rights of publicity claimants have only to prove an 
67 Id. at 1098 (quoting Midler, 849 F.2d at 463).
68 Id. at 1110-1111.
69 Id.
70 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103
71
 Dawson, supra note 48, at 646.
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unauthorized use of their persona for commercial purposes.72  Second, the purpose of the 
Lanham Act, and, in particular, §43(a) is based on providing consumers with certainty as 
to a product’s origin.  Meanwhile, publicity rights, under the rubric of property law, are 
concerned with protecting a celebrity’s value, notwithstanding negative effects on the 
consumer.  
C. Arguments Against the Right of Publicity
In light of the abovementioned justifications for a right of publicity, several 
scholars have posited countervailing arguments against either the rationales for the 
existence of this right or, more importantly, the extent of protection.  
i. Arguments against the Economic Justifications
Most critics base their arguments against the economic justifications on the 
assumption that, although celebrities may have some intrinsic value to their name and 
likeness, it is third parties that play a primary role in creating the celebrity’s persona.73
They contend that publicity rights, giving exclusive protection against unauthorized 
appropriation, overlook the roles of the media, managers, studios, photographers, and the 
audience, to name a few parties, in creating and enhancing a celebrity’s value.  
Consequently, although the celebrity “labors” to a certain extent, thereby validating a 
property-based rationale, it is the labor of others that creates the true value.74  One could 
even proffer that a celebrity’s exclusive right of publicity leads to reverse unjust 
enrichment since the celebrity will financially benefit from the protection, while those 
most responsible for the value’s creation obtain no economic rights.
72 See Grandpre, supra note 55, at 80-81
73
 Kwall, supra note 44, at 55; Cirino, supra note 20, at 793-794.
74
 Kwall, supra note 44, at 55.
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In his often-cited article criticizing publicity rights, Professor Michael Madow 
argues that “[t]he notion that a star’s public image is nothing else than congealed star 
labor is just the folklore of celebrity, the bedtime story the celebrity industry prefers to 
tell us and, perhaps, itself.”75  Professor Madow claims that not only is “fame often 
conferred or withheld…for reasons and on grounds other than ‘merit’”, but also that a 
celebrity’s image is truly controlled by the media.76  In addition, Madow, and others, 
have posited that an unjust enrichment rationale is misplaced because celebrities will 
intrinsically borrow from the labor of other celebrities.77
Professor Madow’s position, however, is problematic for several reasons.  First, 
his contention does not differentiate between overnight celebrities, like Paris Hilton, who, 
arguably, do little to create their value, and an athlete who trains from the age of two 
before achieving celebrity-status, like Tiger Woods.  In both cases, although the media, 
management, and fans play a role in creating the persona, the life-long “labors” of Woods 
certainly can not be ignored.  Even if third parties aided in creating the value for Woods-
like celebrities, his life-long undertaking to perfect a skill serves to affirm the 
appropriateness in providing an exclusive right to the commercial use of his name and 
likeness.  
In addition, Professor Madow’s contention flies in the face of basic rationales 
underlying both real and intellectual property law.  As right of publicity advocate and 
expert Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall points out, “even if others help mold a 
celebrity’s image, the celebrity herself is still responsible for the vast majority of the 
75
 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image; Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 125, at 184 (1993).
76 Id.
77 See Kwall, supra note 44, at 55.
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profit potential of her persona.  Those who assist the plaintiff in creating a marketable 
persona typically are paid for their time and efforts.”78  For example and in line with 
property rights, if a homeowner hires a designer to refurbish a bedroom, thereby, 
increasing home’s overall value, the designer does not obtain any property rights in the 
house itself.  Normally, the designer’s sole form of compensation is a fair-value payment 
for his time and effort.  Further illuminating Kwall’s argument is the fact that even those 
parties not paid by the celebrity - media and studios - derive income from capitalizing on 
the celebrity’s star status.  
In comparison to copyright precedent, court have consistently held that producers 
of a motion picture retain all the exclusive rights, as enumerated under section 106 of the 
1976 Copyright Act, even though many parties are necessary, and thus employed, to 
technically “produce” the film.  Courts have stated that giving copyrights to all parties 
involved in the process would lead to an unworkable system.  In short, these parties are 
paid for their labor and thus retain no rights.79  The same argument exists, if, like 
Professor Kwall contends, one places the right of publicity within the pantheon of 
copyright law so that a celebrity is the “producer”, in totality, of her image.
ii. Arguments against Consumer Protection Justifications
Professor Madow identified several rationales to undercut the policy of protecting 
consumers from deceptive trade practices via an exclusive right of publicity.  He posits 
that:
1) In selecting a product, “most consumers probably think less and care less about 
licensing arrangements between celebrities and advertisers”
78 Id. at 56.
79 See Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990); Lindsay v. RMS Titanic, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1609 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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2) It is not clear that consumers a priori link endorsement with celebrity 
merchandise
3) Undesirability of permitting advertisers of dangerous and shoddy product to 
manipulate consumers by exploiting powerful celebrity images.80
In short, “the right applies even absent a danger that consumers will be misled into 
believing that there is an association of, or endorsement by, the publicity plaintiff of a 
particular product.”81
Professor Madow’s arguments are dubious when analyzed under the current state 
of marketing and merchandising in our global society.  It is difficult to comprehend why 
Nike would sign athletes to multi-million dollar endorsement contracts if the value of 
their image did not induce an association in the consumer’s mind between the 
endorsement and the product’s quality.82  No logical argument exists for the expenditure 
of such capital if not for a profitable return based on a persona-quality association.  In 
addition, many athletes are contractually obliged to use the products they endorse.  Since 
an athlete’s performance would diminish with the use of inferior equipment, this furthers 
the argument that the product is not only of a high quality, but that consumers will 
associate the endorser with the good.  
Furthermore, if such an association exists, the justification for an exclusive right 
to control one’s image in order to avoid consumer confusion is made that much stronger.  
For example, if Nike pays Tiger Woods to endorse and use a particular set of golf clubs 
bearing his name, and yet a third party can simply appropriate Woods’ name, without 
authorization, for an inferior set of clubs, consumer will have difficulty differentiating 
80
 Madow, supra note 75, at 228-229.
81
 Kwall, supra note 44, at 55.
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 Lebron Gets $90 Million in Nike Deal, Associated Press (May 23, 2003), available at
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which product bears an authentic endorsement.  Not only would this economically injure 
the consumer who makes a confusion, which arguably was the competitor’s intent, but 
Woods’ image is economically injured because those consumers will associate his name 
with a product of inferior quality.  As the Supreme Court of California stated 
“…Entertainment and sports celebrities are the leading players in our Public Drama…We 
copy their mannerisms, their styles, their modes of conversation and of consumption”83
Part II – Right of Publicity in California and New York
Due to the lack of a comprehensive federal scheme, potential right of publicity 
plaintiffs must rely on divergent state law and precedent.  Consequently, publicity right 
claims brought in different states and, yet, alleging the same misappropriation will not 
receive a consistent remedy, if at all.  Although twenty-seven states now protect, in one 
form or another, the right of publicity, this article will concentrate on the two most 
influential, yet highly discordant states: California and New York.  For the sake of 
comparison and inclusion, this section will also briefly discuss the protection schemes in 
existence in Tennessee and Indiana, the latter of which is often considered the most 
aggressive and well-defined statutory scheme in the United States.
A. California
As one would expect, California state courts, as well as the Ninth Circuit have 
provided rich and influential jurisprudence defining the extensions and limitations on the 
right of publicity.  In addition to a detailed statutory scheme, the courts have explicitly 
83 Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, 25 Cal. 4th. 387, at 397 (2001).
26
indoctrinated a broadly-defined common law publicity right.  Entertaining such a 
common law action was instrumental in the Midler decision. 
i. Statutory Scheme
One weapon potential plaintiff’s have at their disposal in a right of publicity 
action is section 3344 of the California Civil Code.  Enacted one year after, and in close 
conformity with, William Prosser’s article enunciating four distinct privacy law torts, 
section 3344(a) of the Code embodies the law regarding the appropriation of name and 
likeness for commercial purposes.  It states in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice signature, photograph or 
likeness, in any manner,…for purposes of advertising or selling…without such 
person’s prior consent…shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or
persons injured as a result thereof.84
Several significant characteristics of the statute are worth mentioning.  First, it 
enumerates a person’s protectable traits - name, voice, signature, photograph and 
likeness.  Courts have interpreted the legislature’s intent in specifying protected traits as 
creating an absolute list.  Consequently, the Midler court dismissed her statutory claim 
because Ford did not actually use her voice in the commercial, but simply hired someone 
to imitate it.85
Second, the statute only protects knowing uses of the enumerated indicia. 
Therefore, unlike the common law, mistake and inadvertence are viable defenses against 
claims of commercial misappropriation.86  Finally, section 3344(g) of the statute 
stipulates that the statutory remedies “are cumulative and shall be in addition to any 
84
 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (West 1997).
85 Midler, 849 F.2d 460, 463.
86
 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(g) (West 1997); Cirino, supra note 20, at 780.
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others provided for by law.”87 (emphasis added)  This section implies that a court may 
entertain a common law right of publicity claim, providing a remedy for the 
misappropriation of indicia in addition to those stipulated in the statute.  It is on this basis 
that the Midler court affirmed her cause of action.88
ii. Common Law
Unlike the traits enumerated under 3344(a), the common law right of publicity 
embraces an expansive, yet ultimately ambiguous, set of indicia.  It is precisely the 
court’s plaintiff-generous extension of protectable indicia that has significantly expanded 
a celebrity’s exclusive right to control the commercial use of their identity, arguably, in 
toto.
In White v. Samsung,89 the Ninth Circuit held that the California common law 
right of publicity includes “appropriations of identity” that extent beyond name and 
likeness protection, as provided under 3344(a), and includes the “unauthorized use of 
attributes that leave no doubt as to whom the attributes belong to.”90  Though decided 
several years after Midler, the majority opinion in White, in extending protected indicia, 
helps explain the Midler court’s decision to protect her voice from imitator 
misappropriation.  
Since Midler and White, the opinions’ influence is evident from the long line of 
decisions expanding the purview of common law publicity right protection.  As Midler
implies, a defendant’s appropriation of any aspect of a plaintiff’s persona may lead to 
87
 Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(g) (West 1997).
88 See Midler, 849 F.2d 460.
89 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992)
90
 Cirino, supra note 20, at 785 (citing White, 971 F.2d 1395, 1398-1399.
28
liability so long as the plaintiff is clearly identifiable.91  However, Midler’s progeny have 
also led to stinging dissenting opinions from Judge Kozinski, a right of publicity expert.
Judge Kozinski’s dissenting opinion in White suggests that the common law right 
would inappropriately extend to anything that “evokes” a celebrity’s personality.92 Judge 
Kozinski, among others, fear that White would provide courts with unbridled discretion 
based on subjective and unpredictable standards defining what constitutes a celebrity’s 
“personality”.93  Even more problematic, in terms of consistent jurisprudence, is the fact 
that indicia of identity evoking a celebrity’s personality, giving light to a colorable claim, 
will differentiate between plaintiffs.  Notwithstanding Judge Kozinski’s well-grounded 
apprehensions on the negative effects of an expansive right of publicity protection, the 
White decision reflects the jurisdiction’s historical willingness to protect traits beyond 
those enumerated in 3344(a).  In this author’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit’s natural 
expansion of common law protection is vital because celebrities will have intrinsic value 
for unique aspects of their overall persona.  Through the years these indicia have included 
an athlete’s association with a distinctive racecar,94 a slogan or phrase closely linked with 
a talk show host,95 nicknames,96 protection of vocal style,97 and, perhaps, protection over 
fictional characters directly evoking the actor.98
91 MAGGS & SCHECHTER, supra note 24, at 630.  It is important to note that the same language, requiring 
clear identifiability, appears in §3344(b)(1), further defining §3344(a)’s parameters.
92 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514-1516 (1993) (Kozinski, J. dissenting)
93 See Id.
94 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, at 824 (9th Cir. 1974).
95 Carson, 698 F.2d 831.
96 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 90 Wis.2d 379 (1979).
97
 Waits, 978 F.2d 1093.
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Since Midler, the Fifth Circuit has also unequivocally recognized the common law tort of 
misappropriation protecting the unauthorized use of one’s name, image or likeness.99  In 
conjunction with the Ninth Circuit decisions, this is important because it will, to some degree, 
harmonize common law right of publicity jurisprudence, thereby providing a certain semblance 
of certainty to right-holders and advertisers, alike.  It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit 
decisions explicitly discussed Waits and Midler in assessing the plaintiff’s common law claims.  
As a result, one can argue that not only are jurisdictions willing to entertain right of publicity 
decisions from foreign jurisdictions, but also that they regard the Ninth Circuit as a sort of 
torchbearer.
B. New York 
Not every jurisdiction is willing to recognize a common law right of publicity.  
New York courts, since 1903, have consistently denied the existence of such a right.100
The state court’s reluctance to recognize common law protection right is perplexing since 
Haelen, a Second Circuit decision, was instrumental in spearheading common law 
publicity rights.  The lack of harmonization between state and federal courts in the same 
jurisdiction, unfortunately, results in further ambiguity and murkiness.
i. Statutory Protection
New York state courts have held that the state publicity statute is the sole source 
of protection for parties asserting right of publicity claims.101  This line of jurisprudence 
began in 1903 when the state’s highest court decided Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box 
99 Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 275 (5th 
Cir. 1987)).
100 Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428 (1981).
101 Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (1984).
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Company.102  In Roberson, the Franklin Mills Corporation printed 25,000 posters 
featuring the plaintiff-teenager.  These advertisements were hung in stores and saloons 
and caused “great humiliation by…scoffs and jeers.”103  The plaintiff, under a theory of 
unauthorized use of her photograph, a claim of first impression in the jurisdiction, sought 
$15,000 in damages for injury to reputation.  She also sought an injunction against further 
dissemination of her picture.104
The court of appeals, in a narrow 4-3 decision, sided with “well-settled” principles 
of law guiding the advertising profession and refused to accept the existence of a proper 
claim under the common law rubric for the right of privacy.  The court noted, somewhat 
prophetically, that “the legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily provide 
that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the picture or the name 
of another for advertising purposes without his consent.”105  Taking the bull by the horn, 
the state legislature responded to the decision as suggested.
The same year as the appellate court handed down Roberson, the New York State 
legislature enacted sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.  Although codified as a 
privacy statute, the law protects against the unauthorized use of a person’s “name, 
portrait or picture” for advertising purposes.106  Due in large part to the legislative 
decision to enact sections 50 and 51, courts have expressly affirmed the Roberson
holding that a common law right of publicity does not exist, thereby, relegating 
protection solely to the statute.107
102 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, 171 N.Y. 538 (1902)
103 Id. at 542-543.
104 Id. at 543.
105 Id. at 545.
106
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107 See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584.
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Although it is argued that New York state courts have liberally interpreted the 
statute’s “name, picture, or portrait” language, to permit claims of likeness 
misappropriation, they have never recognized a common law right found valid under 
Haelan.108  Broadly interpreting the statutory language, state courts have permitted 
recovery for depictions of celebrities that are easily recognizable.  However, they have 
never construed the statute so liberally as to permit recovery for appropriations of voice 
(Midler) or personal attributes (White).109  It is of course important to remember that the 
California courts were also unwilling to extend statutory protection for imitated voice and 
personal attribute misappropriation, limiting the respective plaintiff’s remedial grounds to 
the more liberal common law.
As one can easily imagine, the national pervasiveness and dissemination of 
advertising, accomplished almost instantly with the developments in broadband 
technology, can cause many issues for right of publicity claimants in light of New York 
jurisprudence.  For a plaintiff like Midler, though she could seek relief in California, as 
well as several other states, her case would lose in New York because of the court’s 
unwillingness to entertain either a common law right of publicity claim or to extend the 
statute’s language to voice misappropriation.  Moreover, several post-Haelan Second 
Circuit decisions, decided under New York law, are looking solely to section 50 and 51 
for applicable protection guidelines.110  Consequently, although the claimant’s injury is 
felt nation-wide, her redressable claims are limited to specific jurisdictions which may 
not award her damages for acts occurring outside the jurisdiction itself.  It also requires 
108 See Cirino, supra note 20, 775-777.
109 See generally Cirino, supra note 20.
110 See Pirone v. MacMillian, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2nd Cir. 1990) (“The New York courts have 
indicated clearly that the Civil Rights Law preempts any common law right of publicity action…”). 
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plaintiffs, residing in states like New York, to file a claim in a California-like jurisdiction 
although the injury partially occurs in their home state.
C. Tennessee
Tennessee’s right of publicity law was the birth child of a series of cases, as well 
as liberal legislatures, of the state’s favorite son: Elvis Aron Presley.111  Initially, 
Presley’s estate, those entrusted to ensure that they pre-approve and license all 
memorabilia featuring “The King” and manufactured by third parties, lost a convoluted 
yet highly influential decision at the Second Circuit.  In Factors, Etc. v. Pro Arts, the 
Second Circuit concluded that as a choice of law matter, Tennessee law was to apply.  
The problem for the plaintiff was that the Tennessee state courts, as well as the Sixth 
Circuit, which has federal jurisdiction over Tennessee, previously held that the right of 
publicity did not exist under common law.  Consequently, since the Second Circuit 
elected to apply Tennessee law, coupled with the fact that no relevant statute existed at 
the time, the court ruled against Factors, Etc.112
The estate’s fiduciary quickly realized the enormity of the situation and, 
specifically, the overwhelming monetary and moral implications of the decision.  As a 
result, Presley’s estate decided to wage a two-pronged attack, through the legislature, as 
well as the courts.113
At the state appellate court level, in State ex. rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Fund 
v. Crowell, the court held that, in fact, Tennessee did recognize a common law right of 
111 Factors Etc., Inc. V. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. V. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 
F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980). 
112
 See Factors Etc., Inc. V. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); See Factors Etc., Inc. V. Pro Arts, 
Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981)
113 See W. Mack Webner and Leigh Ann Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line Between Commercial 
Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171, 177-178 (2004).
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publicity.114  The next month, the Sixth Circuit, in Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, 
reversed its own decision and held that since a state court rejected the non-existence of a 
common law right of publicity, it was bound to follow that court’s decision.115  It is 
certainly interesting to note that not only did the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Elvisly come 
merely seven years after the Factors decisions, but that the court wholly disregarded the 
doctrine of stare decisis and simply, or conveniently, followed the ruling of a state court 
over which no jurisdiction exists.  As Eric Goodman states, “States without such special 
interests are less likely to have strong right of publicity laws.”116
As the legislative level, the estate successfully helped pass the state’s first right of 
publicity statute, which, interestingly, strongly mirrored the federal trademark statute –
The Lanham Act.  Federal trademark protection for the Elvis name was possible by this 
time because the singer/actor’s name had attained sufficient distinctiveness, necessary for 
such protection.117  With a trademark on the name, the estate could prevent, through 
federal means, the unauthorized reproduction of Elvis’ name and portrait on or in 
connection with any goods or services for which they had obtained registration.  
Not only did the use of trademark language provide the estate with incredibly 
broad protection in itself, but another aspect of trademark law made the Tennessee statute 
wholly distinctive from those of other states: length of protection.  In accordance with the 
Lanham Act, the Tennessee right of publicity statute provides, theoretically, perpetual 
protection.  It declares that the right continues for so long as it is not abandoned.118  As 
114
 State ex. rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Fund v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
115 Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, 817 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987).
116
 Eric Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227, at 239 (1999).
117 See Webner, supra note 113, at 177-178; Tenn. Code Ann. 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108 (2005). 
118 Tenn. Code Ann. 47-25-1104 (2005).
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such, the right is also descendible and transferable.  The perpetual protection under 
Trademark law, demarcates one of the greatest differences between that law and 
Copyright, since the latter protects works for a limited time.  When evaluating in which 
intellectual property scheme the right of publicity best fits, if either, the length of 
protection must remain one of the most important factors.  
D. Indiana
Such “special interests” were probably also at play in Indiana, which in 1998 
passed one of the most comprehensive, progressive, and detailed right of publicity 
statutes in the country.119  Highly encouraged by CMG Worldwide, an Indiana-based 
talent agency, the statute protects individuals under Indiana state law “regardless of a 
person’s domicile, residence, or citizenship.”120  Consequently, any infringing material 
crossing into Indiana would open up the infringer to a right of publicity action within the 
state, regardless of whether the potential-plaintiff actually resided within the state’s 
borders.
Although the issue is beyond this paper’s scope, one of the main problems with 
this language is determining what is to be regarded as activity within the state.  Does 
infringing material that fortuitously enters the state, through no explicit action of the 
infringer create a viable claim?  Or does the plaintiff need to demonstrate that the 
infringer intentionally sent the materials into the state?  In further analyzing this issue, 
one must consider, in the context of the pervasiveness of the Internet, if whether a claim 
in Indiana exists when someone in the state simply accesses a website, with a server not 
physically in the state, but nonetheless consisting of infringing material.    
119 Ind. Code Ann. 32-36-1-1 to 32-36-1-20 (2006) (original statute Ind. Code Ann. 32-13-1-1 to 32-13-1-
20 was repealed by P.L.2-2002, § 128, effective July 1, 2002).
120 Id. At 32-36-1-1(a).
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E. Protection of the Non-Famous, Descendability & Transferability
Prior to discussing the methods of protection for publicity rights, if any, in foreign 
countries, several additional considerations exist regarding the extent of protection, both 
in the United States and abroad.  First, although the majority of right of publicity 
discussions is celebrity-centric, most, if not all, applicable state statutory laws, as well as 
common law decisions, do not require fame as a precursor to protection.  Second, the 
issue of the descendability and transferability of this property right, as discussed in 
Lugosi, has received significant attention because it would extent protection well beyond 
the life of the subject and protect personal value that, arguably, no longer exist.  
i. Protection of the Non-Famous
Though mostly posited to protect the value of a celebrity’s image, the right of 
publicity can extend to protect persons whose image has no intrinsic value at the time of 
the misappropriation.  Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, a preeminent right of publicity 
scholar, argued in his oft-cited thesis on the subject that the protection is not limited to 
the famous.121  Steven Getzoff, chair of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) taskforce 
on federalizing a right of publicity, stated that “traditionally, the right of publicity was 
considered only available to famous people….he [McCarthy] blew all of us away by 
asserting that everyone has a right of publicity, irrespective of whether they were 
famous.”122
The protection of the non-famous, via the right of publicity, though rare, 
demonstrates the willingness of courts and legislatures to protect private individuals 
against both the moral improprieties resulting from the misappropriation, as well as the 
121 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:15 (1987).
122
 Hamilton, supra note 10, at 227.
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right to redress the increase in image-value, ex post facto.  Therefore, a “private” plaintiff 
may seek redress for privacy-type reputational harms or property-type economic 
injury.123  As several cases, discussed below, impliedly hold, the fact that the person’s 
likeness at the time of misappropriation has no celebrity-esque value will not serve as a 
bar to remedy if the unauthorized use was for commercial gain, which, arguably, creates 
the requisite value.
In Mendonsa v. Time Inc.,124 the defendant offered for $1,600 copies of a famous 
picture featuring a sailor kissing a nurse on V-J Day.  Although Time had originally 
published the picture in 1945, in its newspaper, and had subsequently republished it, the 
defendant’s decision to sell the pictures in 1987 brought about the action for 
misappropriation of likeness.125  Though not a celebrity in his own right, the plaintiff’s 
picture had achieved considerable fame, and, thus created value in his image.  This 
proposition is clearly demonstrated by the fair market value the defendant sought for the 
pictures.  The Rhode Island court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss not because 
of the intrinsic value in the plaintiff’s image, but because of the purely commercial nature 
of the sale.126  The court also clearly stated that non-commercial uses of the picture, and, 
therefore, likely protected under the First Amendment, would not justify an action for a 
right of publicity.127  Therefore, prior to selling the picture for commercial purposes, 
Time was required to obtain Mendonsa’s consent.  However, if Time wished to reproduce 
the image in a news-style setting, consent was not required since the First Amendment 
protected the use.
123 See McCarthy, supra note 121, at § 4:15.
124 Mendonsa v. Time Inc., 678 F.Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1988).
125 Id. at 968-969.
126 Id. at 973.
127 See Id. at 972.
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The Mendonsa decision demonstrated the court’s departure, in cases involving 
non-famous individuals, from what the Carson decision described as a “cause of 
action…to protect a celebrity’s identity, which can be valuable in the promotion of 
products”128 to an analysis focusing on the commercial use of the likeness.  This shift is 
directly in line with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C stating that if a defendant 
appropriates a person’s name or likeness to his commercial advantage, he derives a direct 
benefit from the use.129  Furthering this interpretation, the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas, in Henley v. Dillard Department Stores, stated that “[t]he 
plaintiff in a right of publicity action is not required to show that the defendant made 
money off the commercial use....What Plaintiff must prove is that Defendant received a 
commercial benefit…he would otherwise not have received.”130  The court described the 
benefit to advertisers as “being able to catch the eye of the consumer and make the ad 
more interesting.”131
New York courts have also protected the non-famous from unauthorized 
commercial use of their “name, picture, or portrait”, in accordance with Sections 50 and 
51 of the Civil Code.  As previously noted, the New York courts rely solely on the 
statutory law for right of publicity protection that does not require pre-existing fame.  
Unauthorized use in advertising or in trade is the sole value-related prerequisite in the 
statute’s language.  In Beverley v. Choices Women’s Medical Center Inc., the court held 
that the inclusion of a doctor’s photograph in a calendar advertising medical services was 
128 Henley, 46 F.Supp.2d at 597 (citing Carson, 698 F.2d at 835)).
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(C) (1977).
130 Henley, 46 F.Supp.2d 587, at 597.
131 Id. at 596.
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actionable under Sections 50 & 51.132  Although the court acknowledged the public 
interest message underlying the calendar, it found that the photograph was used for 
advertising purposes.133
As noted, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s use of the name or 
likeness was for commercial purpose.  This element is a prerequisite regardless of 
whether the case is brought under privacy protection for emotional harm or for economic 
injury under the rubric of the right of publicity.  In Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., the 
plaintiff sued because of the emotional trauma felt as a result of seeing his photograph, 
taken while he was serving in Vietnam, on promotional materials for a series of books 
about the war.134  The court, siding with the plaintiff, determined that if the “defendant 
simply used the plaintiff’s picture in a book to depict the history of the Vietnam War, the 
use would have been privileged by the First Amendment, regardless of the profit motive 
underlying the book.”135  However, it reasoned that the defendant had to provide 
compensation for the “individual whose likeness is helping to stimulate those profits.”136
Instead of affording First Amendment protection for the entire project, the court 
differentiated the purpose, and thus, protection of the two mediums – advertisements and 
books.  While the latter was perceived as constitutionally protected, the former was of a 
purely commercial nature, thereby requiring authorization and remuneration.137  In all of 
these cases, the plaintiff’s status as a non-celebrity was not a bar to recovery.  
132 Beverley v. Choices Women’s Medical Center Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991)
133 Id. at 279.
134 Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F.Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986).
135
 Kwall, supra note 44, at 98 (citing Tellado, 643 F.Supp. 904, 914.)
136 Id.
137 See Tellado, 643 F.Supp. 904, 913-914).
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Interestingly, based on precedent, and, in particular Tellado, one could argue that 
non-famous people have a broader right of publicity protection than celebrities.  This 
distinction exists because a private person can bring a colorable right of publicity claim 
for emotional, as well as economic injury.  As previously discussed, several courts have
held that celebrities can not bring a right of publicity claim based solely on injury to 
reputation because they have voluntarily placed themselves in the public light, thus 
forgoing their “private person” status.  However, the same does not hold for a non-
celebrity who never voluntarily entered the public arena.  This proposition rests on the 
Tellado decision which held that the advertisements violated the plaintiff’s right of 
publicity because of its commercial nature.  It is important to remember that the brunt of 
Tellado’s alleged injury rested on emotional harm, and not economic injury.  Therefore, 
one can postulate that a private individual retains their “private” status, giving rise to a 
right of publicity claim for reputational and emotional harm resulting from the 
commercial use of his name or likeness – a remedy not available for celebrities.
ii. Descendability and Transferability
Aside from protection of the non-celebrity, courts have grappled with the issue of 
descendability and transferability when it came to publicity right protection.  Can an heir 
sue for the commercial misappropriation of a deceased’s name and likeness?  As 
discussed, identity rights have been deemed both a personal right and a property right, 
under privacy law and the right of publicity, respectively. 
As a personal right, it is akin to defamation, and usually limited to living persons.  
As a property right, courts and state legislatures have had to decide whether it is 
descendible, like other property, as an asset of the estate upon the death of a person, 
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under the law of the jurisdiction where the deceased was domiciled at the time of his or 
her death.  “Once you call something a right of publicity, then essentially it becomes a 
commodity for trade, and a commodity survives its creator.”138
Courts which perceived publicity rights under the rubric of privacy tended to 
regard the right as personal, and, consequently, incapable of surviving death.  On the 
other hand, courts interpreting the right under the property model were inclined to permit 
descendability.  Some courts have even intimated that the right is inheritable only if it 
was exploited during the person’s lifetime.  However, this latter opinion is divergent from 
Professor McCarthy who surmises that “the overwhelming majority rule under either 
statute or common law is that the right of publicity is descendible property and has a 
postmortem duration which is not conditioned on lifetime exploitation.”139
As previously mentioned, Justice Bird’s decision in Lugosi was the first explicit 
recognition of an inheritable right of publicity.  Although not making a determination on 
the actual merits of the case, Justice Bird denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and 
held that Lugosi’s heirs had made a colorable and proper right of publicity claim.  After 
Lugosi, the California legislatures enacted California Civil Code 3344(g), now California 
Civil Code 3344.1, to further cement post-mortem rights, as well as resolve any 
ambiguity created by subsequent Lugosi-esque decisions.140  Of particular note, the 
statute does not require that the deceased have used his name or likeness during his 
lifetime in order for heirs to obtain rights.
138
 Hamilton, supra note 10, at 227-228.
139
 McCarthy, supra note 121, at § 9:17.
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 See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (West 2000). (The entire interest in those rights belongs to the surviving 
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The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in the above-mentioned case involving the Elvis 
Presley International Memorial Foundation, articulated several justifications for a 
descendible right.  
1) it promotes an individual’s right to testamentary distribution
2) prevents unjust enrichment
3) promotes a celebrity’s expectation that she is creating something of value to 
pass on to her heirs and assigns after her death
4) promotes the expectation of any licensees with whom the celebrity might have 
contracted, and
5) furthers the public interest in truthful representations regarding sponsorship of 
goods141
It is interesting to note, and furthers the recognition of the right of publicity as a 
neighboring right to intellectual property, that the majority of these justifications are 
synonymous with those expressed for copyright and trademark protection.  
Federal court decisions have also found the right descendible.  In a much 
celebrated case involving Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s wife Corretta Scott King, the 11th
Circuit explicitly held that: 1) the image of Dr. King was inheritable, and; 2) exploitation 
during his lifetime was not a prerequisite for protection.142  The court stated “[i]f the right 
of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value of the right of publicity during 
life would be diminished because the celebrity’s untimely death would seriously impair, 
if not destroy, the value of the right of continued commercial use.”143  Furthermore, Dr. 
King’s decision not to exploit his name or likeness during his lifetime was, in essence, a 
commercial use because such a decision constituted a financial decision.144
141 State ex rel. Elvis Presley International Memorial Foundation v. Cromwell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97-98 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
142 See Martin Luther King Jr. Center For Social Change v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 694 F.2d 
674, 672-676 (11th Cir. 1983).
143 Id. at 682.
144 Id.
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However, unlike the 11th Circuit and California court precedent, among others, 
New York State courts have held that the rights, covered under Section 50 and 51 of the 
Civil Code, were not inheritable because publicity rights fell under the rubric of privacy 
law.145  The court held that since the legislature did not explicitly carve out an 
inheritability exception for unauthorized commercial use of a person’s “name, picture or 
portrait”, post-mortem rights did not exist.146
In sum, a growing number of states have determined that a person's post-mortem 
right of publicity can be assigned while the person is living and are inheritable after 
death.  However, the inquiry regarding inheritability also includes the, arguably, more 
important question as to the duration of protection during which an heir could bring a 
claim.  In short, how long should a person’s name and image remain protectable against 
unremunerated and unauthorized commercial use?  Again, state statutes are discordant 
extending protection anywhere from 10 years to 100 years.147  As one can understand, the 
lack of national conformity and the associated problems, discussed throughout this 
article, has fueled arguments for federal legislation.148
F. Prima Facie Case
Although major differences exist between the scope of state right of publicity 
protection, one important commonality exists: elements underlying a prima facie case.  
Essentially, as described in Eastwood v. Superior Court, a plaintiff invariably must 
allege, and eventually prove, 4 elements: “1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
identity; 2) the appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to the defendant’s 
145
 Fisher, supra note 9, at 104.
146 Id. (citing Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2nd Cir. 1990).
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advantage, commercial or otherwise; 3) lack of consent; and 4) resulting injury.”149
Although courts have used distinct wording in their respective prima facie standards, 
these basic elements are common throughout.150
Substantiating the first element, use of the plaintiff’s identity, will depend almost 
wholly on whether the indicia of identity claimed to have been infringed is even protected 
in a specific state.  As discussed above, California’s broad common law principles would 
cover elements of identity that states like New York, with its narrower statutory 
language, would not protect.  It is also quite possible that a state recognizing right of 
publicity protection under common law would refuse to extend it as far as the court in 
White.  However, since most cases involve the unauthorized use of a name or picture, 
“Identifiability of plaintiff will probably not be a disputable issue in the majority of 
meritorious Right of Publicity cases.”151  It is the outlying cases, like Midler and White, 
which not only create wonderful theoretical debate for law school classrooms but, as 
evidenced by the Ninth Circuit, also create undeniable problems for the courts.  
Meanwhile, the third element, lack of consent, is fairly straightforward and does not 
require further discussion.  
The second element creates several issues because of its ambiguous wording.  It 
also permits courts to make relevant determinations on an ad hoc basis.  As the court in 
Henley stated, “The “benefit” element requires Plaintiff to prove that Defendant derived 
some commercial benefit…as opposed to deriving no commercial benefit due to the fact 
149 Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, at 347 (CT. App. 1983); Cardtoons v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 
654); See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir, 1994).  
150 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3, :4 (2d ed. rev. Mar. 
2002) at v, §3:2
151 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 3.2 (1998).
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that the use was incidental.”152  Furthermore, Comment d of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts reads: It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the 
defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or likeness 
that the right of privacy is invaded.153  Consequently, the appropriation of the person’s 
name or likeness must be explicitly and directly linked to the defendant’s commercial 
advantage.  Based on this language, the court in Polsby v. Spruill held that intent to make 
a profit from the publication of an ad, without proof that a profit resulted, is not sufficient 
to demonstrate a commercial benefit.154  The court stated that the defendant must use “the 
name or likeness for the express purpose of appropriating the commercial benefit that is 
particularly associated with the name or likeness of the plaintiff.”155 Consequently, as for 
the Polsby court, the defendant’s intent, as well as proof of a profit, no matter how small, 
is of crucial evidentiary importance.156
However, it appears that the Polsby court is in the minority when it comes to 
proving a commercial benefit.  After discussing the Polsby holding, the Henley court 
explicitly rejected the profit requirement, refusing to require proof that a “defendant 
made a profit or secured a tangible benefit from the use of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness”.157  This reasoning is directly in line with the Fifth Circuit in Matthews, as well 
as J. Thomas McCarthy, which stated that the defendant should not be immune to liability 
simply because “the product promoted is undesirable, the ad [is] clumsy or somehow 
152 Henley v. Dillard Department Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587, at 596 (N.D. Texas 1999). 
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment d. (1977).
154 See Polsby v. Spruill, Civ. No. 96-1641 (TFH), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11621 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1997).
155 Id. at *13.
156 See generally Id.
157 Henley, 46 F.Supp.2d 587, at 597.
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ineffective, or sales slump[ed] during the relevant period.”158  Thus, demonstrating the 
commercial benefit element is normally not dependent on proof of profit.  
G. Right of Publicity and the First Amendment – The Mother of all Red 
Herrings
Pundits urging the narrowing or complete elimination of a right of publicity 
almost universally rest their arguments, in whole or in part, on the First Amendment.  
They contend that right of publicity protection endangers the freedoms granted under the 
First Amendment because it inevitably, and thus, unconstitutionally, restricts the methods 
by which parties can disseminate information.159  However, upon further review of both 
case law and statutory provision regarding the right of publicity, any observer would 
readily recognize the overwhelming weakness, if not complete dearth, of such a legal 
argument.  As discussed below, right of publicity case law – arguably broad at times – as 
well as statutory provisions do nothing more than try to avoid the creation of loopholes 
through which advertisers can misappropriate a person’s name or likeness, while 
simultaneously and explicitly upholding First Amendment guarantees.  
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press…”160  Recognizing the vital attributes 
underlying the freedom of speech in any democracy, Justice Brandeis stated in his 
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both as 
158 Henley, 46 F.Supp.2d 587, at 597.
159 See generally White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissent); See generally
Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissent).
160 U.S. Const. amend. 1.
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an end and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and 
courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that freedom to think as you 
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would 
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against 
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an 
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle to the American government.161
Providing some teeth to Justice Brandeis’ lofty ideals, the California Supreme Court 
declared that the two main purposes of the First Amendment with regard to the freedom 
of speech: “First, to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas’…second, to foster a 
fundamental respect for individual development and self-realization.”162  In essence, 
based on subsequent case law, the latter’s purpose is evoked to balance the “uninhibited” 
goal of the former.  Whether in the realm of news or entertainment, courts have 
universally held that the marketplace of ideas can’t operate with impunity, even in the 
face of the 1st Amendment.    
In regards to newsgathering and dissemination, the 1st Amendment protects the 
press from liability when it publishes matters of public interest.  The Supreme Court held 
that the “First Amendment provides an absolute defense to publication-based tort actions 
for publications on matters of public interest, unless the publications contain knowing or 
reckless falsehood.”163  Interpreting New York State statutory law regarding “public 
interest” and newsworthiness, the federal appellate court for the Southern District of New 
York held “New York courts have deemed as a matter of public interest not only news in 
161 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, at 375 (1927).
162 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, at 866 (1979).
163
 Schulyer M. Moore, Putting the Brakes on the Right of Publicity, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 49 (2001) 
quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2997, at 3008 (1974) (defamation) and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 
S.Ct. 534 (1967) (public disclosure of private facts).
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the sense of current events but also all types of factual, educational and historical data, or 
even entertainment and amusement…”164
This broad and liberal definition provides the news media substantial leeway 
under the 1st Amendment banner, even in the case of right of publicity actions.  However, 
such protection is quelled in the context of commercial speech.  Realizing the importance 
of the dissemination of information, state legislatures and courts have tried to craft a 
“remedy by balancing society’s high degree of entitlement in the area of informational 
uses against the type of harm being suffered by the plaintiff, the potential of consumer 
deception resulting from the defendant’s unauthorized use…and the potential for unjust 
enrichment.”165  Consequently, most courts require the plaintiff to demonstrate, not only 
the authorized appropriation of their name or image, but that such misappropriation took
place in a commercial context.  For example, in Mendonsa, discussed previously, the 
court found that the sale of the pictures was commercial in nature, and therefore, upheld 
the plaintiff’s claim of “misappropriation of likeness.  However, the court also stated that 
it “could not determine whether all other publications of the photograph that occurred 
subsequent to the original publication were commercial in nature.”166  In essence, if the 
defendant had simply republished the picture in a newspaper, without the direct effort to 
profit off the picture itself, Mendonsa could probably not have demonstrated a prima 
facie case.167
164 Psihoyos v. National Examiner, 1998 WL 336655, at 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In Galella v. Onassis, 353 
F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) the court held that the test for determining “newsworthiness” involved a 
balancing of factors such as: the social value of the fact published, the depth of the intrusion into 
exclusively private affairs, and the extent to which the party voluntarily assumed a position of public 
notoriety. 
165
 Kwall, supra note 44, at 95..
166 Id. at 94.
167 Id.; See generally Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986) wherein the 
defendant used the plaintiff’s picture, taken while he was serving in Vietnam, in various promotional 
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Requiring commercial use is equally important in light of Supreme Court 
precedent regarding First Amendment protection for commercial speech.  As early as 
1976, the Supreme Court recognized that wholly commercial speech is afforded some 
First Amendment protection.  Two years later the Court noted that this protection is 
different than other forms of speech and is subject to more regulation.  As noted by 
Roberta Kwall, one of the Court’s concerns probably stemmed from the potential harm to 
society as a result of consumer deception.168  With the groundwork in place, the Court 
decided the seminal case, Central Hudson Gas and Elect. Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm’n of New York, in which it promulgated a four-part test for determining the 
breadth of First Amendment protection for commercial speech.169  The Court held that 
commercial speech can not be restricted unless the following elements are met: 1) The 
commercial speech must concern lawful activity that is neither false nor misleading; 2) 
The asserted governmental interest in restricting the speech must be substantial; 3) The 
restriction must directly advance the asserted governmental interest; and 4) The 
restriction must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.170  The Court 
concluded that speech proposing a commercial transaction is traditionally subject to 
materials for a series of books dealing with the Vietnam War.  The photograph was not used in any of the 
books themselves but simply on the advertisements.  The court held that the defendant could have used the 
photograph in the books while retaining 1st Amendment protection because such use would be considered 
newsworthy, regardless of the profit motive underlying the book.  However, use of the photograph on the 
advertising material did constitute a breach of the plaintiff’s right of publicity because these promotional 
materials were not considered newsworthy, and therefore afforded a much lower degree of protection under 
the 1st Amendment.  
168 See Kwall, supra note 44, at 66-69.
169 Central Hudson Gas and Elect. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980).
170 Id.
49
governmental regulation, unlike those types of speech – news or purely informational –
that normally garner absolute First Amendment protection.171
It is under this precept of commercial speech in relation to First Amendment 
protection that state statutes and court decisions have undertaken to establish right of 
publicity doctrine.  And it is under this rubric in which they operate today, even in the 
face of growing skepticism and criticism over the broadening of common law “likeness” 
interpretations.  It is also why this author unequivocally disagrees with scholars and 
judges who argue that right of publicity doctrine, particularly as a result of White, is 
spiraling out of control and heading towards a slippery slope that will inevitably create a 
severe, and perhaps irreversible conflict, with the First Amendment.  The main reason for 
this respectful disagreement is the fact that precedent and statutory schemes have 
explicitly taken into account First Amendment guarantees and incorporated safeguards 
into their decisions and laws, respectively.  It is precisely due to these safeguards that 
right of publicity plaintiffs MUST provide a high degree of evidence demonstrating 
commercial use of their name, image or likeness.  
In addition, the plaintiff is required to adequately prove the unauthorized use of 
their indicia of identity.  Some may argue that White clearly overstepped any bounds of 
rationality because it, in essence, gave the plaintiff an exclusive right over the 
commercial use of a blond-wigged robot in a game show setting.172  Meanwhile, right of 
publicity advocates may counter by positing that evidence in the case demonstrated that 
consumers equated the robot with the plaintiff, as one in the same.  Therefore, if the case 
came out the other way, it would simply provide advertisers with another tool, one now 
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endorsed by courts, with which to create the perception of endorsement, regardless of its 
falsity.  
Robots, notwithstanding of how life-like, could potentially replace the need to 
ever obtain a celebrity’s consent.  It is this author’s opinion that such a potential loophole 
is exactly why right of publicity decisions hinge on the consumer perception of the use, 
because ultimately it is them who will suffer from such deceptive tactics.  While the 
celebrity is forced to internalize the loss of value and public scorn over the false 
association, consumers will internalize the potential negative consequences on the back 
end by purchasing items under the misconception of a particular celebrity’s endorsement.  
This author also contends that potential effects to consumers is also one of the policy 
reasons as to why courts and legislatures are not willing give advertisers, among others, 
carte blanche for commercial speech.  Such restrictions are simply necessary in light of 
the market-driven consumer society, overwhelmed with manufacturing competition, in 
which much of the developed world lives.
Part III: Global Right of Publicity Protection
Although much rhetoric continues to permeate legal discourse surrounding the 
need for a federal right of publicity, the pervasiveness of advertising, now on a global 
scale, serves the need to consider the availability of such protection in foreign lands.  As 
P. John Kozyris noted, comparative law perspectives are “needed now more than ever 
because of the expansion of international transactions; the globalization of legal culture; 
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and the movements for unification, federation, and law reform around the world.”173  This 
is even more important for U.S. celebrities whose names and likenesses have tremendous 
value worldwide.174  “Many advertisements are internationally distributed.  The internet 
is the ultimate borderless medium, incorporating both content and advertising.”175
Consequently, an understanding of foreign publicity rights is all the more imperative to 
avoid substantial destruction to a celebrity’s value.  To that end, in the first true sign of 
the need for global harmonization, the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal 
hosted a symposium dedicated to international right of publicity schemes.  
Please note that the decision regarding which countries to include within the 
following survey was based wholly on the availability of relevant matter rather than a 
subjective decision based on personal preferences.  The reader should in no way interpret 
the exclusion of an Asian country from this section as a lack of interest, but simply the 
unfortunate result of an inability of obtaining information.
A. United Kingdom
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom does not recognize a per se right of 
publicity, or any synonymous right to protect against commercial misappropriation of 
one’s name or likeness.  For celebrities, the only course of redress, though limited, 
resides in either intellectual property law, in particular, copyright or trademark, as well as 
the tort of “passing off”.  However, the English courts have narrowly construed publicity 
protection under these devices.
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i. Copyright Law
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (“CDPA”)176 is, theoretically, 
one avenue for protection against commercial misappropriation.  Chapter 48 of the 
CDPA states that the copyright owner of an original artistic picture may prevent third 
parties from unauthorized reproduction or exploitation of such work.177  Therefore, a 
celebrity acquiring copyright in an image has the right to prevent unauthorized 
commercial reproduction when a “substantial portion of the plaintiff’s work” has been 
appropriated.  
However, this protection is only available with the picture itself, and not the 
subject underlying the image.  The court in Re: Elvis Presley Trademarks, Inc., stated 
“[t]here is nothing akin to copyright in a name….Furthermore, an individual cannot 
obtain copyright in his own appearance.”178  The court reasoned that if such a right 
existed, a celebrity could prevent a fan from tattooing the celebrity’s image on his 
person.179  The court’s reluctance to entertain a claim for copyright in a name is in line 
with historical English case law.  Since 1869, courts have refused to “recognize the 
absolute right of a person to a particular name…whatever cause of annoyance it may 
be.”180  These judges were unwilling to differentiate, under copyright protection, between 
non-commercial, a tattoo, and commercial use of the name or likeness.181
Furthermore, the courts have only thinly granted the right of bona fide copyright 
holders, as under Chapter 48, to prevent the reproduction of an image.  In Bauman v. 
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Fussell, the court held that a painting incorporating the unauthorized reproduction of a 
“protected” photograph was not a Chapter 48 infringement because the artist had 
introduced personal creative vision into the painting and merely used the photograph as a 
reference.182  Although some may argue that the defendant clearly used a “substantial 
portion” of the picture, in derogation of the CDPA, court’s have defined “substantial 
portion” as an analysis of quantitative and, more importantly, qualitative measures.  Not 
only how much of the work was appropriated, but whether that portion which the 
defendant recreated was the “feeling and artistic character” of the underlying work.183
ii. Trademark Law
Under the Trade Marks Act of 1994, names, theoretically, receive protection, so 
long as they achieve the requisite level of distinctiveness.184  Distinctiveness is attained 
when the name is: invented, not descriptive to the product’s characteristics, the 
applicant’s signature, or if the name is unique.185  However, this protection is limited, if 
not altogether inapplicable, for celebrities.  Although celebrities have attempted to protect 
their names under the Act, the relevant case law implies that “the more famous a 
personality becomes, as his or her name or nickname passes into common usage, the less 
likely it is that he or she will be entitled to claim an exclusive right to the name.”186
To illustrate this contention, the court in Re: Elvis Presley Trademarks, Inc., did 
not permit the plaintiff’s to register the name “Elvis Presley” because it was too well 
known to the public and, therefore, not distinctive.187  In short, the more famous the 
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celebrity the less likely he will have the right, because of a lack of distinctiveness, to 
register the name, and, thereafter, prevent its use in advertisements.188  The court also 
surmised that the likelihood of confusion in having multiple manufacturers appropriate 
the image was both irrelevant and non-existent.  “When people buy a toy of a well known 
character because it depicts that character, I have no reason to believe that they care one 
way or another who made sold or licensed it.”189  It also appears that the court did not 
entertain an unjust enrichment argument, a cornerstone of United States Trademark 
protection, in rejecting the plaintiff’s registration petition.
In another likelihood of confusion action, the musical group ABBA sued for the 
unauthorized use of their images on T-shirts and pillowcases.190  ABBA’s central 
argument was that the defendant was exploiting their image and that purchasers would 
incorrectly assume that the group had endorsed or were otherwise associated with these 
products.191  The court vehemently disagreed with the plaintiff’s characterization of the 
purchasing public’s naivety, stating “I do not think anyone reading the 
advertisements…could reasonably imagine that all pop stars…were giving their approval 
for the goods offered.”192  Since ABBA was in the music business and the defendant in 
the business of selling images, confusion either could not occur or that the public would 
not care if the, obviously illusory, endorsements were authentic.  
It is clear that the English courts will not protect a celebrity’s name or likeness to 
the extent US court’s would, pursuant to a §43(a) action under the Lanham Act, because 
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in their view likelihood of confusion will not ensue.  In addition, since the names, 
themselves, are not distinctive, unjust enrichment is not a viable argument.  
iii. Common Law Tort of Passing Off
Although ABBA did not present a colorable claim of consumer confusion under 
the Trade Mark Act, an action under the common law tort of passing off could provide a 
similarly-situated celebrity a proper remedy.  The tort of passing off, originating from 
acts of intentional deception, presumes to protect against consumer confusion and unjust 
enrichment, two justification courts were unwilling to entertain under the trademark 
cases.  According to Hayley Stallard, “[w]here a personality is sufficiently well-known, 
the non-consensual use of his or her name, image, or voice may give rise to a 
misrepresentation that the personality endorses, of is connected with, the products or 
services in question.”193  As Lord Langdale stated “a man is not to sell his own goods 
under the pretence that they are the goods of another man.”194  This is so because the 
“property right protected is not that of the mark, the name, or the get-up itself, but the 
right in the goodwill attached to the business.”195
However, courts have constructed an overwhelmingly narrow window of 
protection, requiring that the plaintiff be actively engaged in the merchandising business 
in order to demonstrate a prima facie case.196  The ABBA court reasoned that the group 
could not preclude the use of their name on t-shirts because they had never marketed such 
goods themselves.  Therefore, they could not establish the requisite goodwill.197
193
 Stallard, supra note 179, at 570.
194
 Julie King, The Protection of Personality Rights for Athletes and Entertainers Under English Intellectual 
Property Law: Practical Difficulties in Relying on an Action of Passing Off, 7 Sports Law J. 351, 353-354 
(2000) (quoting Perry v. Truefit, 6 Beav. 66, at 73 (1842)).
195
 King, supra note 194, at 354.
196 Id.
197
 Stallard, supra note 179, at 578.
56
In order to prevail, a plaintiff-celebrity would have to demonstrate that he had a 
reputation as an endorser, and that a significant portion of the public would mistakenly 
believe he endorsed the product.  Even if the celebrity passes this hurdle, the courts have 
held that an “unofficial” disclaimer on the product was sufficient to prevent consumer 
confusion.  Further complicating the matter is the fact that courts will only apply these 
principles to fictional characters and not real persons, who do not own the copyright in 
their name or likeness.  
In Halliwell v. Panini SpA, the court was unwilling to grant an injunction to the 
“Spice Girls” in connection with a series of unauthorized stickers of the singers that did 
not include a disclaimer.198  The court disagreed with the plaintiff that the lack of a 
disclaimer would confuse the public.  It held that the “absence of the word ‘unofficial’ on 
the defendant’s product would not mislead the public.”199  The court, synonymous with 
Elvis, held that the public placed very little, to no, significance on whether the 
endorsement was official relevance and that the “official” designation on the public’s 
purchasing decisions was minimal, at best.200  Therefore, consumer confusion, a 
prerequisite to a passing off claim, did not exist.
iv. Midler in the United Kingdom
As is evident, the prospect of Bette Midler prevailing on a “right of publicity” 
claim in the United Kingdom is relatively weak.  Based on the Elvis decision, and the 
English courts basic aversion to affording a celebrity intellectual property ownership in 
their name or likeness, the likelihood of a cause under either the CDPA or the Trade 
Mark Act seems far-fetched.  First, under the CDPA Chapter 48, the court clearly held 
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that no copyright resides in a name.  Second, a court would probably find that Milder’s 
name was not distinctive, as interpreted by case law, and, therefore, unprotected 
regardless of the commercial nature of a third party’s use.  Consequently, this author 
contends that, all things being equal, in the sense that Midler’s popularity and goodwill 
are identical in the United Kingdom as they are in the United States, her best hopes for 
recovery reside in a “passing off” action. 
In Reckitt & Coleman Products v. Borden, Inc., the House of Lords promulgated a 
three-part test to demonstrate a prima facie claim for passing off:
1) Plaintiff’s reputation: Goodwill must be established in the mind of the 
public, or a reputation attached to the goods/services that he supplies by 
association with the identification of the packaging/get-up;
2) Defendant’s representation: Establish misrepresentation by defendant to 
the public – intentionally or not – leading – or likely to lead – the public 
to believe defendant’s goods are plaintiff’s goods/services; and,
3) Likelihood of damage: Demonstrate that he suffers – or is likely to 
suffer – damage by reason of the erroneous belief caused by defendant’s 
mis-representation.201
Based on Midler’s career and persona, the singer could demonstrate that requisite 
goodwill in the minds of the public.  As to the test’s second prong, the Midler court held 
that the defendant made an intentional misrepresentation presumably leading to consumer 
confusion.  However, as noted, English precedent takes an extremely narrow view of 
possible consumer confusion.  Judge Oliver, in ABBA, simply did not believe that 
reasonable people would connect the plaintiff with the defendant’s goods or services even 
in the face of unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.202  More recently, in 
the Spice Girls case, the court concluded that the public simply did not care about the 
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202
 King, supra note 194, at 360.
58
product’s origin.  The public solely desired the product itself.203  Unlike with U.S. right 
of publicity case law, not requiring proof of consumer confusion, Midler would have to 
show direct evidence of confusion.  One option would be to compile consumer surveys 
demonstrating confusion over the product’s endorsement and origin, akin to that used in 
trademark likelihood of confusion actions under §43(a) of the Lanham Act.  Although 
case law has created a presumption against a finding of confusion, compelling survey 
results may overcome the ABBA-created prejudice.
Even if Midler established consumer confusion, her reluctance to enter the world 
of endorsements will probably create a complete bar to recovery.  In order to prevail in a 
passing off action, Midler would have to prove that a common field of activity existed 
between Ford’s use of her voice in advertisements and her personal initiatives in 
merchandising.204  In ABBA, Judge Oliver refused to entertain the group’s damage claim 
because they had never carried on any business in the UK beyond the production of 
music.  Since ABBA had never entered the field of merchandising, not only would that 
preclude a finding of consumer confusion, but ABBA could not prove damages through 
the unauthorized use of their name.205  As a result, if Midler had previously endorsed 
products, and, in particular, automobiles, she would probably have a better chance to 
prevail.  However, her aversion to advertising, for whatever reason, may be her ultimate 
downfall.  It is also interesting to note that English case law does not resolve, in regards 
to “common field of activity”, whether Midler would simply have had to previously 
endorse any product or whether she had to have actually endorsed an automobile in order 
to prevail over Ford’s use of her voice.  
203 Id. at 366-367.
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The sheer lack of protection leaves celebrities with very few remedial options.  
Consequently, Julie King urges celebrities to follow certain guidelines to best protect 
their identity.  She suggests:
Incorporate as a company as soon as possible with a registered trademark for the 
company logo and name…and signature of the individual, whether or not it is 
potentially problematic.  Registration should be secured in classes that include 
common merchandising products such as textiles and stationary….Approach 
merchandising from an educational perspective…to inform the public of official 
merchandise….Take a number of photos in which the individual can own the 
copyright, and make them available as part of press kits that go along with the 
concept merchandising….Start immediately to trade in a wide variety of 
merchandise.206
Although good advice for celebrities who rely almost solely on their name and 
picture, it would not protect Midler, or other similarly-situated performers whose intrinsic 
value is derived from indicia beyond name or likeness.  First, the English trademark 
system does not permit the registration of a person’s voice.  Even if Midler could register 
her voice as a trademark, Ford did not use her actual voice but accomplished the 
misappropriation through a sound a-like.  Second, the English system forces performer’s 
like Midler to merchandise products potentially undermining their personal values 
regarding commercialization.  Consequently, notwithstanding Ms. King’s 
recommendation, Midler would almost certainly not prevail in a publicity rights action 
under English law.
B. France
Translated as la droit a l’image, the right of image in France is muddled in 
ambiguity, particularly, in relation to the protection against unauthorized commercial use 
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of one’s name or image.207  The right, derived from the general tort under Article 1382 of 
the Civil Code, is mired in controversy as to whether it is a property right, akin to the 
United States right of publicity, and, therefore applicable against commercial 
misappropriation, or whether the right solely provides a personal privacy protection.  If 
it’s the latter, it would only protect against the morally-based repercussions – reputation 
and embarrassment – associated with unauthorized use of a name or likeness.208
i. Droit a L’image
Article 1382 of the Civil Code states, quite broadly and ambiguously, that: Any 
person who performs an act that harms another person must compensate the other for the 
harm cause by that act.209  Out of this Article judicial precedent extrapolated a right of 
image, recognized as a bundle of personality rights, including the right to prevent the 
unauthorized fixation and reproduction of one’s image.210  Although a slight shift in the 
courts have occurred, this personality protection consisted mostly of moral rights: “the 
right to privacy, the right to protect one’s honor and reputation, and the right to control 
the use of one’s image.”211  It is only recently, and narrowly, that French courts are 
entertaining a commercial misappropriation claim under this right of image bundle. 
The moral rights underlying the right of image was first recognized by French 
courts in the late 19th century in a case commonly referred to as the Rachel Affair.212  In 
the Rachel Affair, an artist drew a portrait of the famous actress Rachel on her deathbed, 
and, thereafter, proceeded to sell the work.  Understandably, the deceased’s family 
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vehemently objected to the sale and initiated a right of privacy, not a right of image, 
action.213  The court, siding with the family, held “[n]o one may, without the explicit 
consent of the family, reproduce and bring to the public eye the image of an individual on 
her deathbed whatever the celebrity of the person involved.”214  The court found the basis 
for its decision under the moral right of respect for the family’s suffering.  
Since the Rachel Affair, French courts have broadened the scope of protection 
and established a right of image independent from actions regarding invasion into 
someone’s private life.  For example, in the Papillon decision, the court held that the 
plaintiff had the right to prohibit the unauthorized use of his photograph on the front 
cover of a book detailing his life.215  The court held that the book itself was not an 
invasion of privacy.  However, the use of the photograph, without the plaintiff’s consent, 
infringed his right of image.216
In light of Papillon, French courts have begun to face the dilemma characterized 
as the conflicting concepts between a right to one’s image versus a right on one’s image. 
Right of image experts Elisabeth Logeais and Jean-Baptiste Schroeder explain that 
understanding the difference between privacy and property arguments for protection of 
one’s image is key: 
On the one hand, the right to protect one’s image from unwanted exposure 
embodies a privacy interest.  This aspect flows from the general difficulty in 
placing a specific value on one’s personal rights, while also recognizing the 
general consensus that one cannot alienate a personal attribute – the extra 
patrimonial nature of the right….On the other hand, the right also embodies the 
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desire to protect a marketable asset…characterized as the right on the image (or 
the right to profit on the image) – the patrimonial nature.217 (emphasis added)   
The Paris Court of Appeals, recognizing this problematic distinction, held that a 
violation of the right of image may cause both economic and moral injury when a 
celebrity had attained commercial value to his image.218  Consequently, “the modern 
perception of the right of image recognizes its dual nature, encompassing both a negative, 
subjective right to prohibit fixation and reproduction of one’s image, as well as a positive, 
economic right to commercially exploit one’s image.”219  It is important to note that 
“image”, in France, includes likeness, voice, photograph, portrait, or video reproduction.
Right of image case law has explicitly stated that any person, regardless of fame, 
can prevent the misappropriation of their image.  As Logeais and Schroeder discuss, 
judicial precedent has established four principles regarding the right to one’s image.  
First, the medium used to reproduce the person’s image is irrelevant.  Second, a 
celebrity’s stage name is also protected, even if fictitious, because the name is 
representative of their personality.  Third, the person must remain recognizable in the 
reproduction.  The less famous the person in the image, the more conspicuous his image 
must be in the reproduction.  Finally, courts have strongly affirmed the concept that 
“[c]onsent must be clearly expressed for both the taking and the further usage of the 
person’s image.”220
These principles have broadened the scope of protection courts will entertain to 
include, though narrowly, claims against commercial misappropriation of a celebrity’s 
property value in their image.  In Noah v. Soc. Frse de Revues Team, the court upheld the 
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right of the plaintiff, Yannick Noah, a famous tennis player, to prevent the unauthorized 
reproduction of his photograph in brochures lacking any informative captions.221  The 
court found that the brochure was purely commercial and, therefore, dismissed the 
defendant’s newsworthy argument.222
Interestingly, French courts have also bifurcated their analysis as to the type of 
injury suffered, both directly on the celebrity and the potential injury caused by consumer 
confusion.  In Belmondo, Halliday and Vartan v. Eminence, the defendant’s posters 
portrayed impersonators of the plaintiff-singers.223  The court awarded damages because 
consumers were shown to have believed that the singers had endorsed the product.  
However, since the singers had never marketed their image, the court held that awarding 
damages for direct economic injury to the plaintiff’s value were inappropriate because the 
plaintiffs could not demonstrate a loss of profits.224  In relation to Midler, the court’s 
willingness to recognize the ensuing consumer confusion due to the use of an imitator as 
the basis for recovery is vital to a successful claim.
ii. Midler in France
Based on Logeais and Schroeder’s extrapolated principles, as well as the French 
court’s recent propensity for protecting the right to one’s image, Midler could prevail in a 
claim against Ford.  Under French law, the two relevant prongs regarding Midler pertain 
to: 1) whether Midler was recognizable in the reproduction of her “image”, and 2) the 
lack of consent.
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As in Belmondo, French courts will entertain claims of misappropriation where 
the advertisers employed the services of imitators to copy a celebrity’s highly 
distinguished traits.  As early as 1975, a French court held that “the imitation of the 
actor’s voice infringed his personality rights and such wrongdoing entailed moral and 
professional damage.”225  Consequently, if Midler can properly demonstrate that 
consumers mistakenly believed the voice in the commercial was hers, as she did in the 
United States, the use of an imitator will not prevent a finding of infringement.  
Many consider the “consent” requirement the key element in determining the 
breadth of permission to use one’s image.  The use of a person’s image requires prior, 
express, and specific consent given for a specific use and duration.  Furthermore, the 
toleration of past uses does not constitute a general waiver to persistent future 
appropriation.226  For Midler, the fact that she explicitly forbade Ford to use her voice in 
their advertisements will work greatly to her advantage.
Although Midler is likely to prevail in a case against Ford, the court will probably 
diminish the extent of damages because of her persistent refusal to market herself beyond 
her professional career.  She could receive damages as a result of the consumer 
confusion, but a court will not award her economic damages, in line with Belmondo, 
because she had never marketed herself in the past. Therefore, a court might decide that 
she could not prove lost profits to her merchandising enterprise.  However, such a 
holding would ignore the potential of future lost profits both in merchandising, as well as 
in her acting career.  For example, if the advertisement was dishonorable to Midler’s 
reputation, the market value of her image could plummet.  
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As discussed, Midler was forced to internalize the externalities of Ford’s actions.  
In order to avoid such a consequence, a court may be better off disregarding past 
merchandising, or lack thereof, as the sole indicator of lost profits and entertain evidence 
of future economic loss.  This would produce two positive and equitable results.  First, it 
would economically redress the injury to the plaintiff’s intrinsic value.  Second, it would 
further deter advertisers from engaging in deceptive merchandising because it would 
close the remedial loop-hole requiring a demonstration of direct and contemporary lost 
profits.
C. Italy
Like many countries, Italy’s legal framework does not expressly provide right of 
publicity protection.  However, an individual is not without protection, as courts have 
recently concluded that several sections of the Italian Civil Code, modeled after the 
French Code Civil, protect the “right to image” as that of a personality right.227
Particularly, an individual can seek redress through several statutory enactments centered 
on an individual’s privacy, protection of one’s image or name, and copyright law.  
However, as this section will discuss, the greatest degree of protection may lie outside the 
bounds of legislative language, and with the court’s judicially recreated right, which in 
some respects mirrors the amorphous language in White.  
i. Statutory Law 
The Italian Civil Code incorporates several articles under which a private 
individual can seek protection from the unauthorized use of his name or image.  In 
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particular, Articles 6 and 7 protect the right to one name, while Article 10 is directed at a 
person’s image.
While Article 6 expressly states the overall premise that “every person has a right 
to the name given [him or her] according to law”, Article 7 articulates the potential for 
judicial intervention.228  The article states: A person whose right to the use of his name is 
contested or who may be prejudiced by the use made of it by others, can judicially 
request that the injurious practice be terminated, without prejudice to the right to recover 
damages.229  Meanwhile, Article 10 provides the ability to prohibit the use of one’s image 
with prior consent.  It states:
Whenever the likeness of a person…has been exhibited or published in cases 
other than those in which such exhibition or publication is permitted by law, or in 
a manner prejudicial to the dignity or reputation of such person or relative, the 
court…can order the termination of such abuse without prejudice to the right to 
damages.230
Interestingly, the ending language of both Article 7 and 10 explicitly notes that the 
issuance of injunctive relief, in terminating the unauthorized use of one’s name or image, 
will not affect the potential for recovery of damages of such use.  Although the language 
of these Articles arguably provides a plausible avenue of redress, in reality the statutes 
are right of privacy centered, and therefore, may bar recovery to celebrities who solely 
claim financial injury.231
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Finally, a person can seek right of publicity redress under Article 96 of the 1941 
Copyright Law that prohibits the unauthorized display, reproduction or commercial 
distribution of a person’s portrait.232  However, akin to the First Amendment argument 
fervent with right of publicity naysayer in the United States, Italy’s Copyright Law 
includes freedom of speech protective language in that Article 96 does not extend to 
“justified” uses including “when reproduction is associated with facts, events and 
ceremonies which are of public interest or have taken place in public.”233  Such use by 
police or for scientific, didactic, or cultural reasons is also protected against publicity 
claims.
ii. Common Law
Although the Italian Civil Code, as well as the Copyright Law provides explicit 
protection against the unauthorized use of one’s name or image, the strongest degree of 
protection may lie with the judicially created right of publicity.  Unlike English case law 
that further hindered the ability of an individual to obtain a proper remedy, creating, 
arguably, insurmountable obstacles to successful litigation, Italian courts have expanded 
the right of publicity protection concurrently available under the Civil Code.  As a result, 
individuals enjoy broad protection against the unauthorized use of their indicia of 
identity, which, in some ways, mirrors the broad language of the Ninth Circuit.
The seminal case, first recognizing the right of publicity, beyond the bounds of 
the Italian Civil Code, involved Lucio Dalla, a famous Italian singer.  Dalla brought an 
action against Autovox SpA, and alleged that the company misappropriated his persona 
in using two of his most distinctive elements, a woolen cap and a pair of small round 
232 See Martuccelli, supra note 228, at 547.
233 Id.
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glasses, in an advertising poster.234  Eerily similar to White and Midler, Dalla argued that 
the defendant misappropriated his persona in that consumers would immediately 
associate the cap and glasses with him, and, consequently, would mistakenly believe that 
he endorsed the products depicted in the poster.  Like Tom Waits, Dalla had always 
refused to endorse products.235
As Silvio Martuccelli notes, the court’s power if not expectation, to “reason by 
analogy” between the Civil Code and a controversy to which no applicable law existed, 
laid the foundation for Dalla’s successful action.  Applying the principles of Article 10, 
“the judge in the Dalla case reasoned that such protection should also apply to 
unauthorized uses of attribution of one’s persona.”236  The court concluded that “Dalla’s 
right of image had been infringed not by the publication of his picture or portrait, but by 
the reproduction of some distinctive elements of his personality…”237  Ever mindful of 
“freedom of speech” counter-arguments, the judge recognized that the use of Dalla’s 
indicia of identity was purely for commercial purposes, not for purposes of public interest 
in information.238
Following Dalla, courts not only embraced the holding but have arguably 
broadened it by awarding protection for “the mere fame or popularity of the celebrity”.239
Two years after Dalla, the Italian court in Bablioni v. Eretel Srl and Disco Spring held 
that the unauthorized use the plaintiff’s image and signature in a calendar constituted a 
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right of publicity infringement.240  Thereafter, the court held that the use of a look-a-like 
of a famous actress – Monica Vitti – in a magazine advertisement misappropriated her 
persona, in large part, because of the uses commercial nature.241  Akin to the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Midler, the use of an imitator will not prevent a right of publicity 
action, so long as the sufficient indicia of identity of the celebrity are evoked.242
As Martucelli synthesizes, Italian courts have justified this broad right of publicity 
on three grounds: 1) protecting “an individual’s interest in personal dignity and 
autonomy”; 2) preventing unjust enrichment by protecting the celebrity’s commercial 
value, and; 3) indirectly protecting consumer against “false suggestions of endorsement”.  
Although these justifications mirror those typically put forth in the United States, the 
Italian system does require one major difference – celebrity status.243
iii. Midler in Italy
Unlike the United Kingdom and France, where Midler may have significant 
problems bringing a successful “right of publicity” action, her chances in Italy are 
extremely strong.  First, instead of a purely privacy-based scheme, which may preclude 
recovery, Italy has fully recognized a celebrity’s right to the commercial value of their 
image.  Second, as the court clearly laid out in Vitti, the use of an impersonator is no 
defense to liability.  Third, Midler’s unwillingness to inject herself into the world of 
endorsements is not a bar to recovery and, in actuality, may work to her advantage in 
arguing that the replication of her voice damaged her reputation.  Finally, and certainly 
most important to a successful action, Martucelli notes that “Italian civil law recognizes 
240 See id. at 552 citing Pret. di Roma, 18 feb. 1986, Il diritto di autore 1986 215.
241 See id. at 552-553 citing Pret. di Roma, 6 july 1987, Il diritto di autore 1987, 570.
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that foreigners have the right to initiate any legal proceedings available to Italian citizens 
to protect the enjoyment and the exploitation of one’s rights.”244
D. Argentina
In Argentina, like the laws of the United Kingdom, no express positive law 
creates a right of publicity.  Protection for the concept of derechos personalisimos, or 
highly personal rights, is derived, if at all, from legal principles existing under different 
bodies of Argentine law.  With an absence of a direct personality rights statute, plaintiffs 
must turn to other bodies of law, including: International Law, Intellectual Property law, 
and the Right to Intimacy and Privacy.245
i. International Law
In accordance with the Argentine Constitution, international agreements are given 
constitutional status making them, in effect, directly applicable into law.  Particularly, the 
Universal Human Rights Declaration (“UHRD”) provides that every human is entitled to 
recognition of one’s legal personality.246  Furthermore, the American Declaration on 
Human Rights and Duties of Man (“ADHR”) provides protection against attacks on a 
person’s reputation and private life.247  Additionally, Article 19 of the Constitution 
specifically protects a person’s right to privacy.248
Two main problems exist when relying on these international laws for a right of 
publicity claim alleging the unauthorized commercial use of a celebrity’s name or 
244 Id. at 561.
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likeness.  First, they do not create any specific and redressable claims but simply put 
forth general notions and directives.  It is up to the signatory State to promulgate legal 
doctrine in accordance with the agreements themselves.  Therefore, a celebrity will still 
need to investigate laws in other sections of the Argentine Legal Code.
Second, the agreements do not appear to address misappropriation of one’s 
likeness under the rubric of a property right, but only as relating to the right of privacy.  
As a result, the agreements, in themselves, may not provide sufficient protection, if any, 
for celebrities whose claims are normally based on a theory of commercial 
misappropriation and lack of adequate compensation for the use of the image, and not for 
the reputation-based arguments common with privacy rights.
ii. Intellectual Property Law
In discussing the right of publicity in Argentina, one must consider possible 
protection under both copyright and trademark law.  Unlike the United States, Argentine 
copyright laws specifically provide protection for publicity rights.  Meanwhile, trademark 
protection could safeguard certain, but not all, aspects of a celebrity’s persona.
Article 31 of the Copyright Law provides that a person’s photograph may not be 
used in commerce absent the express consent of that person.249  Synonymous with French 
laws, consent for a specific use may not be extended to other uses, regardless of past 
toleration.250  Furthermore, the statutes’ protection applies to the use of a person’s image 
and voice in a variety of mediums.  Although the limits of protection are ambiguous, 
many argue that only commercial misappropriations are redressable.  Several non-
249
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commercial uses – educational, newsworthy, scientific and cultural – are explicitly 
exempt.251
In order to bring a right of publicity claim under the Copyright Law, a claimant 
has to demonstrate, akin to the United States, that an “unauthorized use of a person’s 
image or other elements of a person’s identity by means of reproducing the image or 
elements….the plaintiff is not required to show malice, loss of business or clients, 
defamation, harassment, or the invasion of privacy.  Tortious conduct results from the 
mere reproduction of a person’s identity…”252  As mentioned, specific non-commercial 
uses are the only exceptions.  
Argentine Trademark Law would also offer right of publicity protection, though 
solely to a limited set of features.  Specifically, Article 3(h) of the Trademark Law 
protects against the unauthorized use of a person’s name or portrait as a trademark.253
According to Guillermo Cabanellas, Argentine trademark law will protect a person’s 
publicity right in two aspects.  First, if a person registers or uses an aspect of their 
identity as a trademark, he is granted an exclusive property right to that trademark.  This 
protection extends to “aspects such as a person’s name, photograph, picture, or 
likeness.”254  Second, “the elements of a person’s identity may not be used or registered 
as a trademark without such person’s authorization…”255  If a third party wants to use or 
register as a trademark an aspect of a person’s identity – names, pseudonyms and 
portraits – under Article 3(h), that party will need express consent.256
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Therefore, one can argue that Argentine trademark law provides both a sword and 
shield against commercial misappropriation.  As to the former, the law grants an 
exclusive property right that can be employed to prevent unauthorized use.  The law also 
provides a shield in requiring consent prior to the use or registration of a person’s 
identifying features.  
iii. Right to Intimacy and Privacy
Pursuant to Article 1071-bis of the Civil Code, certain unauthorized uses of a 
person’s name, likeness, voice or photograph may constitute a tort for the violation of the 
right of intimacy.257  Article 1071-bis provides that “any person who arbitrarily intrudes 
into another person’s life, publishes portraits…mortifies another person with regard to 
one’s habits or feelings, or otherwise damages his or her intimacy” shall be liable for 
damages.258  Although purportedly a right of publicity statute, Article 1071-bis’ language, 
as well as relevant case law strikes a strong similarity to a right of privacy doctrine 
because of its focus against moral and emotional injury instead of commercial harm.
In Ponzetti de Balbin v. Editorial Atlandia, a newspaper published the picture of a 
prominent politician on his deathbed.259  In an Article 1071-bis action brought by the 
deceased’s family, the court found the paper’s actions reprehensible as an infringement of 
the family’s privacy expectations.260  Other cases have held as infringing both the 
creation of a false or harmful impression on a person’s acquaintances,261 and the placing 
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of a person’s image in a ridiculous setting.262  Furthermore, relevant precedent has 
redressed any damage to a person’s reputation, prestige, or feelings.
iv. Midler in Argentina
Midler could approach a suit under Argentine Law vis-à-vis any of the approaches 
described above.  However, the privacy mantra under which the Argentine Constitution, 
coupled with the UHRD and ADHR, as well as Article 1071-bis apply will make her case 
very difficult to properly demonstrate if based wholly on a theory of loss to commercial 
value.
Midler’s best chance of recovery for a direct right of publicity action is pursuant 
to Argentina’s, unusually, broad copyright laws.  Article 31 prohibits the use of a 
person’s name, image or likeness for commercial purposes without their express consent.  
Furthermore, experts have posited that “image” would include the use of a person’s voice 
without authority.  Of course Midler’s main hurdle relates to the fact that Ford did not 
actually use her voice in the advertisement.  Research for this article did not reveal any 
precedent dealing directly with the issue voice imitation as violative of Article 31.  
Midler could pursue an Article 1071-bis action if she manages to surpass several 
hurdles. First, and foremost, she will need to demonstrate that Ford’s misappropriation 
caused harm, not to her commercial value, but to her reputation and honor as a person 
who, for artistic or personal reasons, refrained from engaging in merchandising.  Her 
persistent refusal to endorse products, notwithstanding her undeniable goodwill, would 
help her cause.  Second, Midler will need to prove that an imitated voice is an attribute 
incorporated within Article 1071-bis.  She could present evidence of consumer confusion 
262 Id. citing Bidart Campos, Una Condena al Sensacionalismo Periodistico por Agraviar la Privacidad de 
Una Persona, 136 E.D. 236 n.3 (1990).
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to argue that using an imitator is irrelevant because consumers believed it was her, due in 
large part to her celebrity status and highly recognizable voice, and, therefore, she 
suffered an injury identical to one suffered via the use of her actual voice.  
Under either theory, she could argue that public policy favors protection against 
unauthorized voice imitation.  If such protection is not granted, the courts would have 
created an incredible loophole for advertisers which would lead to sever economical and 
emotional harms.  Aside from voice misappropriation, such precedent would permit 
advertisers, with impunity, the right to use third parties to imitate any of the personal 
attributes of a celebrity without consent or remuneration.  
E. Brazil
Like its South American neighbor, Brazil protects right of publicity-like interests 
under several bodies of law.263  Though not labeled as right of publicity statutes, the 
Brazilian Constitution and neighboring rights, as well as Consumer Laws can provide 
some forms of protection under the umbrella of personal rights which provide exclusive 
rights to image and privacy.
i. Brazilian Constitution
Article 5, Section X of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution regulates the right to 
privacy, as well as the right to a person’s image.  Section X states that “privacy, private 
life, honor, and the image of all people are inviolable.  It also “assures the right to 
compensation for material and moral harms resulting from violating one’s rights.”264
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The Section’s broad language – material and moral harms - protects against any 
unauthorized use.  In addition, no formalities are required before a plaintiff can invoke 
Section X.265  Unlike the privacy-esque laws prevalent in other States, protecting only 
against emotional and reputational injury, Brazil’s Constitution clearly protects injuries 
related directly to the economic loss associated with the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s 
image.  The “sole prima facie element for violation of the right is lack of consent.”266
According to Deborah Fisch Nigri and Silvia Regina Dain Gandelman, Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis’ right of privacy article had a profound impact on the 
development of Brazil’s privacy and image rights laws.267  In addition, Brazilian law-
makers and courts remain concerned that without effective laws, modern technology 
would further afford advertisers tools to invade a person’s privacy.268  As a result of this 
explicit legislative intent, the courts have construed Section X’s language broadly and, 
arguably, with a pro-plaintiff tendency.  
In Maite Proenca Gallo v. Editora Azul,269 the magazine-defendant published 
photographs of a famous actress during a play in which she appeared nude.  The audience 
was asked to refrain from taking pictures.  In a suit alleging material and moral injury for 
the unauthorized use of the picture, the court found for the plaintiff notwithstanding the 
fact that the picture was reproduced in a newspaper.270
In addition to the Gallo decision, protecting unauthorized exploitation of image 
through a photograph, Section X protection is not limited to an exclusive number of 
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mediums but is malleable with advances in technology.271  Furthermore, the Constitution 
also explicitly protects against the unauthorized use of images and voices of athletes and 
sports celebrities.  Article 5, Section XXVIII(a) states “[i]t is assured under the law 
protection to individual performances of collective works and the reproduction of image 
and human voices…”272  Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide a remedy 
for the commercial misappropriation of a celebrity’s image through the use of an imitator, 
it is easy to assume that a court could extend these Constitutional provisions to entertain 
such a claim. 
Brazil has also recognized the doctrine of neighboring rights as a bona fide 
avenue, used in conjunction with Constitutional provisions and copyright laws, to protect 
a person’s right of publicity.  Neighboring rights protect “modes of expression” not 
explicitly covered in the copyright laws.273  Akin to U.S. copyright laws, Brazilian 
authors and photographers have the exclusive right to prevent the unauthorized 
reproduction of their work.274  Therefore, the government’s recognition and endorsement 
of such rights further supports the idea that a celebrity could garner protection against the 
unauthorized commercial use of her voice, even by way of imitation.  As Nigri and 
Gandelman note “[d]espite the pervasiveness of voices and images in our daily 
life…protection of personal attributes of the persons engaged in these activities has been 
historically considered less worthy of traditional copyright protection than that afforded 
to authors of books and creators of works of art.”275  It appears that the indoctrination of 
neighboring rights, as ancillary to other legal protection measures, demonstrates the 
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government’s willingness to extend personality rights beyond the copyright and 
Constitutional frameworks.  
ii. Consumer Laws and Advertising Regulations
Another avenue of protection for right of publicity plaintiffs exist under Brazilian 
Consumer Laws, as well as regulations directed toward the advertising industry.  Known 
as the Brazil Self Regulatory Publicity Code, the Codigo Brasileiro de Auto-
Regulamentac o Publicitaria (“CBAP”)276 is administered under the auspices of the 
Conselho Nacional de Auto-Regulmentac o Publicitaria (“CONAR”).  In one of the more 
progressive regulatory schemes, these regulations “secure a certain level of protection 
between the advertising agency and its client, and between the agency and the 
consumer.”277
Article 37 under the Consumer Laws forbids any kind of misleading or abusive 
advertisement and states, in relevant part, that:
Section 1: Any kind of public advertisement, totally or partially false, or by any 
means, even by omission, capable of inducing the consumer in error with regard 
to the nature, characteristics, quality, source, price, or any other information 
regarding products and services, is considered misleading;
Section 3: For the purpose of this Code publicity is misleading by omission 
whenever it fails to present essential information regarding the product or 
service.278
Violation of these statutes could lead to the levying of penal and monetary fines 
on anyone, agency and advertiser, who disseminates misleading or abusive publicity 
which could potentially lead to consumer confusion.279
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As noted, claimants can also invoke the CBAP for protection against misleading 
advertisement.  CONAR will entertain allegations centered on protecting an individual’s 
image from being used in an unauthorized method.  They can impose a wide variety of 
penalties including, warnings; recommendations to amend, alter, or correct the 
advertisement; and, even injunctions against further dissemination of the advertisement.  
However, unlike a suit under Brazil’s Consumer Laws, the CBAP apply only to the 
advertising agency and not the advertiser itself.280
iii. Midler in Brazil
Nigri and Gandelman note that Brazil’s definitions of one’s image include voice, 
name, likeness, or “other unique characteristics that distinguish the person from 
others.”281  This broad definition appears synonymous with the Midler court’s broad 
interpretation of publicity rights under common law.  Furthermore, Brazilian law does not 
require a demonstration of economic gain by the defendant in putting forth a colorable 
claim.  As one court held, “any person whose image and/or name were unlawfully used 
for publicity reasons has suffered an invasion of privacy and a patrimonial reduction in 
view of someone else’s profit.  This unlawful use per se allows compensation.”282
According to right of publicity experts, the right of image “embraces 
videophonogram images, television, radio, gestures, and dynamic expressions of one’s 
personality.”283  Therefore, the unauthorized use of one’s voice or, virtually, any body 
part that consumers can identify with a certain individual will lead to a redressable claim.  
In one case, the sister of a deceased artist objected to a film portraying the artist as an 
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uneducated prostitute and blackmailer.  According to the facts, although the film does not 
mention the artist by name, viewers could easily associate the character with the artist.  
The court found for the sister and awarded her compensation for material and moral 
harm, as well as an injunction against the movie’s distribution.284
In line with this precedent and statutory schemes, it is likely that Midler will 
succeed under Brazilian law.  As discussed, the Brazilian Constitution broadly protects a 
person’s exclusive right to their image and voice.  Like the Ninth Circuit, courts in Brazil 
have recognized the importance of placing strict limitations on methods advertisers have 
to market their client’s products and, therefore, have vigilantly protected against the 
fraudulent misappropriation of a celebrity or athlete’s intrinsic value associated with their 
name and likeness.  Although this author could not find a case directly on point with 
Midler, it is fair to assume that a court in Brazil would entertain an Article 5, Section X 
and Section XXVIII(a) suit claiming voice misappropriation through the use of an 
imitator.  In line with Peixoto, a defendant does not have to explicitly use the claimant’s 
“image” in order to violate the Constitutional standards.  Therefore, as long as it’s 
recognizable, simply imitating Midler’s voice is no defense.
 Midler could also bring a colorable claim under the consumer laws, as well as the 
advertising regulations.  The consumer laws prohibit any advertisements meant to 
intentionally mislead the public.  The court explicitly found that Ford, after Midler 
rejected their offer, hired one of Midler’s back-up singers to replicate the crooner’s voice.  
Consequently, the court held that the defendant intentionally desired to mislead the 
public.  Midler would also have to demonstrate that Ford’s advertisement led to actual 
284 Id. at 484 (citing Peixoto v. Empresa Brasileira de Filmes S.A. – Embrafilme & Joaquim Vaz de 
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consumer confusion regarding her purported endorsement.  She could verify such 
confusion through surveys, as well as other statistical methods.  However, the one 
drawback in a suit under the consumer laws is that the penalties do not result in a direct 
remedy for the claimant.  They only provide for criminal sanctions and/or a fine.  
For reasons identical to those stated above, Midler could also seek redress via the 
CBAP in a suit under the advertising regulations.  The one clear benefit to a successful 
claim under these regulations is that the Council can order the advertising agency to 
correct the advertisement or to enjoin its dissemination.  The Council also has the 
authority to “broadcast its position on any violations committed for the failure to comply 
with the imposed measures.”285  For Midler, who does not market her image, corrective 
measures may be a more suitable vindication for her image.   
F. Canada
Like the United States, our neighbors to the North have developed a bifurcated 
approach to protecting against the unauthorized use of a person’s name or likeness, in 
that a individual can find redress both under privacy law and a right known as “character 
merchandising”.286  However, aside from the cosmetic similarities, the development of 
publicity rights in Canada differed significantly from the United States on the theoretical 
level.  As a consequence, protection for celebrities looks, historically at least, eerily 
similar to those of the United Kingdom.
i. Historical Context
Unlike the privacy-centric origins of publicity rights in the United States, 
Canada’s protection schemes arose from the desire to “provide relief against 
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unauthorized character merchandising through the business tort of “passing off”.”287
Early in the development of this legal doctrine, Canadian legal scholars and courts 
realized the intrinsic economical value a celebrity’s name or image can have on the 
purchasing public.  As Robert Howell explains, “The benefit of character merchandising 
is the persuasive influence on consumers that linking a celebrity with a consumer product 
or service may engender.”288  However, the market value created by such use is, in 
reality, a commodity, which Howell rightly notes “belongs to the celebrity”.289  As a 
result, Canada views the tort of passing off as a vehicle to prevent the false representation 
of endorsement for a particular good or service.  In addition, the tort is wholly proprietary 
in nature, and focused on protecting the plaintiff’s goodwill.290  Under Canadian 
jurisprudence, the tort presents two main issues: “(1) the requisite level or content of the 
association between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods or services; and (2) whether the 
public could be confused as to the plaintiff’s endorsement of the defendant’s goods or 
services.”291  As Howell points out, Canadian passing off precedent, prior to the 1970s, 
highly resembled the United Kingdom’s historical and contemporary unwillingness to 
entertain celebrity claims because of their skepticism over consumer confusion due to 
false endorsements.292  Like the UK, celebrities were required to “prove a ‘common field 
of activity’ between the defendant’s product and the celebrity’s persona.293  In short, 
fame and inherent value in one’s name or image was insufficient to bring a prima facie 
claim.  However, in the early to mid-1970s courts began to recognize this inequitable, if 
287 Id. at 490.
288 Id. at 488.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291
 Robert G. Howell, The Common Law Appropriation of Personality Tort, 2 INTELL. PROP. J. 149, 153-
154. (1986) (Can.).
292 See Howell, supra note 286, at 490-491.
293 Id. at 491; See Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 40 D.L.R.3d 15 (Ont. Ct. App.) (1973 Can.).
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not inexistent, relief.  Consequently, the courts created a quasi-hybrid passing off tort, 
appropriation of personality tort that focused on the misappropriation of a celebrity’s 
image and name rather than the highly convoluted “association” element. 
ii. Appropriation of Personality Tort
In Krouse v. Chrysler,294 the plaintiff, a football player, sued for the unauthorized 
use of his image in an advertisement.  Since Krouse was not in the business of selling 
automobiles the court held that the tort of passing off was inapplicable.  However, instead 
of wholly dismissing Krouse’s claim, the court stated, regarding the commercial 
misappropriation of his image, that Canadian law did indeed support a remedy for the 
“appropriation of commercial purposes of another’s likeness, voice or personality.”295
The court ultimately refused to award damages because the league in which Krouse 
played authorized the photograph.296
Although personally unsuccessful, the court in Krouse explicitly recognized the 
right, and need, to provide protection against the unauthorized use of one’s name and 
likeness.  Four years after Krouse, the Ontario High Court had the opportunity to apply 
the appropriation of personality test.   In Athans v. Canadian Adventure Camps, the 
plaintiff-water-skier sued for the misappropriation after the defendant used his image in 
advertisements.297  Although the defendant did not actually use a photograph of Athans, 
but produced an identical line drawing from an acquired photograph, the court found that 
consumers would easily recognize the plaintiff from the drawing.  As a result, the court 
294 Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 40 D.L.R.3d 15 (Ont. Ct. App.) (1973 Can.).
295 Id.
296 Id. The court also stated that the plaintiff should expect “some minor loss of privacy and even some loss 
of potential for commercial exploitation…as a by-product of the express or implied license to publicize the 
institution of the game itself.”  
297 Athans v. Canadian Adventure Camps, 80 D.L.R.3d 583 (Ont. H.C.) (1977 Can.).
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held that the defendant infringed Athans’ exclusive right to market his personality.  The 
key distinction for the court, between Athans and Krouse, was the recognizability of the 
photograph’s subject in that the latter had his back toward the camera while the former’s 
image was clearly depicted.298  Further court decisions have reiterated the “recognizable” 
requirement under Canadian jurisprudence.  In Joseph v. Daniels, the plaintiff claimed a 
violation of wrongful appropriation after the defendant exceeded the scope of consent, 
regarding the underlying photograph of the plaintiff’s torso, and proceeded to use the 
photograph on posters and greeting cards.299  The court held against misappropriation 
because the plaintiff – in that his actual facial image – was not recognizable in the 
photographs.
iii. Midler in Canada      
Midler’s chances for success in Canada, like several of the other countries
discussed above, depend entirely on the court’s interpretation of “recognizability”.  The 
defense will have to argue that her case lies along the same line of reasoning as Athans, 
instead of Krouse, regardless of the fact that the defendant used an impersonator.  Robert 
Howell identifies five elements to establishing a prima facie appropriation of personality 
claim, most of which mirror elements underlying a right of publicity action: “1) plaintiff 
must be identified in the depiction or other indicia; 2) the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s persona should be more than incidental or de minimis; 3) there is no express 
requirement of an intent to misappropriation…; 4) there must be damage; and 5) there 
can not be a public interest in the publication.”300
298 See Howell, supra note 286, at 492-493.
299 Joseph v. Daniels, 4 B.C.L.R.2d 239 (B.C. Sup. Ct.) (1986 Can.).
300
 Howell, supra note 286, 494-495.
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Without a doubt, Midler can establish the second, third, and fourth elements.  
However, the first and fifth could present challenges.  As mentioned above, the court will 
need to take a leap in finding that the use of an imitator is no defense, as to identifiability, 
if the plaintiff can demonstrate that consumers could not differentiate between the sound-
a-like and the true performer.  If the imitation is so true, it is natural that consumer will 
not question whether the voice on the commercial is actually Midler, but simply assume 
that it is indeed her.  Therefore, the use of an imitator will create the same negative 
impact on the commercial value of her image and voice.  She will have to internalize the 
consequences of externalities.  In addition, consumers will be duped into thinking that 
Midler actually endorsed such product, regardless of its potentially vile nature.  
This consumer protection rationale is also very important when arguing that there 
does not exists any public interest in permitting advertisers from flagrantly 
misappropriating a person’s name, image or likeness to the detriment of that party.  If an 
advertiser asks a person’s permission, celebrity or not, to use their indicia of identity and 
that person refuses to participate, that should be the end of the issue.  Advertisers can not 
have the unilateral power to simply disregard that person’s rejection.  This is particularly 
true when the use of such name or image is wholly commercial in nature.  Not only 
would it invade a private person’s right to privacy and a celebrity’s right to appropriate 
remuneration of their valuable image and name, but the advertiser is actually financially 
benefiting from such misappropriation, not only from the potential increase in sales of the 
product, but also since hiring look-a-likes and sound-a-likes probably cost far less the real 
thing.
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The major obstacle for Midler lies in the fact that Canadian courts, to this point, 
have yet to consider the issue of whether the use of imitators violates the 
misappropriation of personality tort because the voice is still “recognizable”.  The court 
may very likely find Midler’s claim in parallel with Krouse in that the advertisement did 
not explicitly depict Midler, but simply her voice.  Of course, if that is the case, the 
question remains as to how should Midler’s persona/voice be depicted in a commercial, 
which simply has a song in the background, unless the ad actually showed Midler singing 
the song?  In the end, this author simply posits that advertisers should not be given such a 
thinly veiled defense for the intentional and fraudulent misappropriation of another’s 
name or likeness. 
G. Foreign Protection Conclusion
Although only a microcosm of the world-wide right of publicity protection 
schemes, those State schemes discussed above provide a sample of the variations that 
currently exist.  They clearly demonstrate the divergent views of the types of protection 
against the unauthorized exploitation of one’s image and likeness.  The fact that these 
countries offer such individualized remedial measures is problematic for Midler-like 
plaintiffs for several reasons.
First, Midler may not have the right to bring a colorable claim in all the 
jurisdictions where the misappropriation occurs, notwithstanding the fact that her claim 
rises out of identical misuse of her voice, arguably, causing identical injuries in all 
relevant States.  We live in a world that permits the instantaneous dissemination of 
information on a global scale.  Internet advancements, and, in particular, broadband 
technology provides advertisers the power to send ads, accessible with the click of a 
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mouse, to all corners of the world.  Furthermore, the pervasiveness of satellite television 
gives broadcasters the ability to beam advertisements to all corners of the world.  
Consequently, injuries associated with the unauthorized commercial use of one’s name or 
image, occur not only instantaneously, but on a much greater scale than in the past.  
Therefore, if one agrees that right of publicity protection is appropriate, we must concur 
that laws in all jurisdictions where the tort is committed must accommodate a redressable 
claim.  
Second, many foreign jurisdictions seemingly protect solely privacy-based 
injuries.  This stands in stark contrast to the United States where numerous jurisdictions 
have evolved from narrow privacy-based protection, addressing only emotional harms, to 
a broader scheme inclusive of economic-centered publicity rights.  The main problem 
with statutes solely protecting emotional injuries is that US precedent have held that 
celebrities could not suffer emotional injuries due to the unauthorized use of their image.  
This exclusion exists because, like other public figures, celebrities had entered the public 
sphere relegating them to a lesser degree of protection.301  In relation to foreign privacy-
oriented laws, nothing to the contrary exists whereby a celebrity may evoke emotional 
injuries as the precursor to a right of publicity-esque claim.  Consequently, foreign courts 
would deny Midler’s claim for two rather circular reasons.  First, she can not bring suit 
alleging damage to the economic value of her persona because such a claim is not 
redressable.  Second, although Midler certainly suffered emotional and reputational harm 
due to Ford’s misappropriation, she is barred from bringing a privacy-based suit because 
she is a celebrity and, therefore, her image is, in essence, part of the public domain.  Her 
sole avenue of protection would exist if she had previously marketed her “image”.  Even 
301
 See Part II.
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then, case law may require that her previous endorsements were for similar, if not 
identical, goods or services to that of the alleged misappropriation.  
Third, States that do not protect against commercial misappropriation provide a 
safe haven for infringing advertisers.  Countries like the United Kingdom grant 
advertisers arguably a green light to infringe on the intrinsic value of a celebrity’s image 
without fear of judicial repercussions because of the difficulty in bringing a redressable 
claim.  In short, advertisers have no incentive to refrain from intentionally 
misappropriating the goodwill and value associated with a particular person.  The main 
problem with this lack of protection is that it will force a celebrity to internalize the 
potentially severe consequences of externalities (i.e. an advertisement depicting a 
fraudulent endorsement of a morally-questionable product).  Aside from injury to the 
celebrity, consumers will also suffer, under UK law, because of the inevitable consumer 
confusion compounded by the court’s complete reluctance to entertain the argument that 
consumer’s expect authenticity regarding the alleged endorsement of merchandise.  On 
the other hand, Brazil’s broad-based protection - consumer law and advertising 
regulations - clearly demonstrate the legislatures’ desire to protect consumers against 
misleading or fraudulent marketing.  
Part IV: Multinational Protection Schemes
Currently, no multilateral agreements specifically address right of publicity 
protection.  In light of the tremendous growth in global merchandising, especially those 
involving U.S. celebrities, some have urged for the creation of a relevant international 
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scheme.302  Although international harmonization has not been official proposed, this Part 
will analyze several multilateral agreements that either contain some level of protection 
or which may be best suited to include a right of publicity provision.  
A. European Convention on Human Rights
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) contains 
language insinuating protection against the unauthorized use of a person’s name or 
image.  It provides that (1) everyone has the right to respect for his family life, his home 
and his correspondence; (2) there shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society…of the protection of health or morals or the rights and freedoms of 
others.303
The European Court on Human Rights in PG and JH v. UK interpreted Article 8 
as protecting a "right to identity and personal developments and the right to establish and 
develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world".304  In short, the 
Article asserts that “[e]veryone has the right to have their private and family life, home 
and mail respected.”305  It is also important to note that Article 8 is complemented by 
302 See generally Dougherty, supra note 1, at 421.
303 See European Convention on Human Rights, sec. 1, art. 8 (1994), available at 
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.Art8.
304
 Jorg Fedtke, et al, Concerns and Ideas about the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How 
Knowledge of Foreign Law Might be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 182 (2004).  In this case, the 
applicants complained that covert listening devices had been used to record conversations at a flat while 
they were detained in a police station.  Thereafter, that information was obtained by the police and used in 
part of a police report that was, thereafter, used in evidence in their trial.  Furthermore, the tape and the 
police report had not been disclosed to the defense at their trial and that the judge had heard evidence from 
the police officer concerned in the absence of the defendants.  
305 Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 173, at 513.
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Article 10 addressing the freedom of expression concerns associated with too broad a 
right of privacy, and require that the two doctrines be balanced on an ad hoc basis.306
In the United Kingdom, the ECHR was recently incorporated into the Human 
Rights Act of 1998 (“HRA”).307 One of the direct legislative intentions of the Act was to 
further common law jurisprudence regarding the right of privacy.308  S. 6 of the HRA 
requires that courts in the UK give effect to ECHR provisions, including Article 8, to 
further interpret privacy right limitations.309  The HRA’s incorporation of the ECHR 
provisions is also important because it gave claimants the right to file suit in UK court for 
alleged right of privacy infringements, rather than having to file suit in the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the normal venue for alleged ECHR violations.310
In a recent case, invoking the ECHR, as incorporated within the HRA, Michael 
Douglas and Catherine-Zeta Jones sued Hello! Magazine for publishing pictures of their 
wedding without consent.  According to the facts, the plaintiffs had contracted 
exclusively with OK! Magazine for the publication of said pictures.  The court held that 
Hello!’s actions breached Article 8, thus infringing the plaintiff’s right of privacy and 
confidence.311  Several experts have equated the key issues in this case with a traditional 
306 See European Convention on Human Rights, sec. 1, art. 8 (1994), available at 
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.Art10.
307 Human Rights Bill, as approved by the House of Lords, 577 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 1726 (1997), 
introduced into the House of Commons, Feb. 6, 1998, 663 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 31 (1998), available in 
United Kingdom Parliament (visited Apr. 10, 1998), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmbills/119/1998119.htm.
308 See Fedtke, supra note 304, at 141.
309 See Id.
310
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311 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., 2 WLR 992 (CA) (2001); Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., EWHC 786 (Ch) (2003); 
Fedtke, supra note 237, at 141.
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right of publicity action, although the court’s decision did not explicitly use that 
terminology.312
While a step towards fully recognizing a right of publicity, most cases brought 
pursuant to Article 8 deal specifically with right of privacy issues.313  This lack of 
jurisprudence, coupled with the court’s reluctance to entertain a true right of publicity 
claim under either its intellectual property schemes or the common law tort of “passing 
off” will continue to leave plaintiffs like Midler without a redressable claim in the UK.  
This author did not find any European Court on Human Rights case law interpreting 
Article 8 under a property-based right of publicity claim.  
B. The Berne Convention 
Most right of publicity experts agree that right of publicity protection belongs 
within the same pantheon as intellectual property law.314  If we agree that the right of 
publicity should in fact exist as a neighboring right to Copyright Law, the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne”)315 may provide an 
appropriate forum.
Currently, Berne does not provide publicity right protection.  One obvious reason 
is that Berne was enacted in 1886, well before the unauthorized commercial use of 
someone’s name and likeness became an international issue.  However, in the one 
hundred-plus years since Berne’s ratification, the agreement remains silent as to 
recognizing the right of publicity.  Furthermore, the relatively recent multilateral 
312 See Fedtke, supra note 304, at 141.
313 See Lauren B. Cardonsky, Towards a Meaningful Right of Privacy in the United Kingdom, 20 B.U. 
INT'L L.J. 393, 410-411 (2002).
314 See generally Kwall, supra note 44; Hamilton, supra note 10.
315
 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Sept. 8, 1886) [as amended on 
Sept. 28, 1979], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html.
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agreements, enacted under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”), an arm of the United Nations, which administers Berne, are also devoid of 
relevant provisions.316
In 1996, WIPO adopted the Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”) 
enunciating levels of protection not found within Berne.  In particular, Article 5 protects 
the moral rights of performers.  It states, in pertinent part: Independently of a performer’s 
economic rights…the performer shall, as regards to this live aural performances or 
performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as the 
performer…and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his 
performances.317  This moral-rights language is, arguably, steeped in privacy law rational, 
protecting against emotional and reputational harm,318 and, therefore, clearly insufficient 
for protecting celebrities’ publicity rights.  Furthermore, it is only intended to protect 
audio performances.  
Realizing this deficiency, several groups have proposed the enactment of a treaty 
affording audiovisual performers both economic and moral rights.319  Known as the 
Audiovisual Performances Treaty (“APT”) the draft Preamble states its goal as 
desiring to develop and maintain the protection of rights of performers in their 
audiovisual performances in a manner as effective and uniform as possible, 
Recognizing the need to introduce new international rules in order to provide 
adequate solutions to the questions raised by economic, cultural and technological 
developments…recognizing the profound impact of the development and 
convergence of information and communication technologies on the production 
and use of audiovisual performances, recognizing the need to maintain a balance 
316 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 174-197 
(Foundation Press 2002).
317
 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 5 (1996), available at Goldstein, supra note 249, at 
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 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: Preserving Personality 
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between the rights of performers in their audiovisual performances and the larger 
public interest, particularly education, research and access to information…320
Originally drafted in 2000 at a conference in Geneva, Switzerland, the APT has yet to be 
ratified.  The APT’s draft language does not directly provide for right of publicity 
protection and is explicitly limited to protecting audiovisual performers in their fixed and, 
in a limited manner, unfixed works.321  However, the Preamble, coupled with the strong 
desire to provide rights of celebrities, in addition to those already existing under Berne, is 
a clear indication that the WIPO recognizes the potential damage to an artist’s intrinsic 
value in a “borderless” world devoid of persona-driven protection.
Although the APT would prove a significant step in the direction of creating a 
baseline universal right of publicity, any treaty under the auspices of the WIPO has 
certain drawback.  Specifically, it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism.  David 
Nimmer stated that “the Achilles’ heel of all the Great Conventions is that they uniformly 
lack enforcement tools.”322  Other prominent scholars have described Berne’s dispute 
resolution mechanism as “effectively worthless” because it did not permit private party 
suits.323
Since the WIPO administers Berne, a private party must petition its State 
Department to file suit on their behalf in the UN’s International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), 
located in De Hague.324  Theoretically a viable option, the ICJ has never heard a 
copyright case.325  There are essentially two main reasons for this lack of judicial 
320
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recourse.  First, even if a case is brought and adjudicated, the ICJ can only enforce a 
judgment if the losing member-state acceded to it.  The winning party would most likely 
have to seek enforcement through the UN Security Council via a threat of economic or 
trade sanctions.326  Considering that a violation of copyright if relatively benign on the 
international sphere, a sanction is highly unlikely.  Second, as Monique Cordray argues, 
no State would ever sue in De Hague for copyright infringement “because the sued state 
would interpret the action as an unfriendly act.”327  Member-states have obviously 
decided that there are “bigger fish to fry” than copyright infringement.  
In context, these experts were referring solely to the Berne Convention.  
However, if States are reluctant to bring copyright claims to the ICJ, notwithstanding the 
billions of dollars lost yearly due to piracy, we must assume that a right of publicity 
action will never see the light of day in the ICJ, even if a protection scheme is enacted.  
Furthermore, nothing in the APT’s draft would indicate the implementation of a new 
enforcement mechanism.  Although, undoubtedly, right of publicity advocates would 
applaud inclusion of a publicity provision in the APT, the lack of an effective centralized 
dispute resolution mechanism is problematic.  Claimants would have to rely on the 
development of internal enforcement mechanisms within the same foreign countries that 
have yet to “adequately and effectively” implement other WIPO treaties.328
C. The World Trade Organization and TRIPs
In contrast to the WIPO, the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) does provide an 
effective dispute resolution mechanism governing all its treaties, including the 
326 Id at 1393.
327
 Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 121, 131 (1994).
328 See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. 2242, § 182 (“Special 301”), available at
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/19C12.txt.
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”).329
Enacted in 1994, TRIPs provides standards concerning the availability, scope, and use of 
all three main intellectual property rights – copyrights, trademarks, and patents.  
Furthermore, TRIPs Article 9 incorporates Articles 1 through 21 of Berne, minus Article 
6-bis protecting moral rights.330
Although TRIPs does not explicitly protect the right of publicity, some level of 
protection may exist under Section 2, relating to Trademarks.  In particular, Article 15(1) 
defines protectable subject matter as: Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, 
shall be capable of constituting a trademark.  Such signs, in particular words including 
personal names, letters, numerals…shall be eligible for registration as trademarks.331
(emphasis added)  Thereafter, Article 16(1), enumerating conferred rights, states: 
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all 
third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade 
identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to 
those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result 
in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical 
goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.332
Taken in combination, Articles 15 and 16 will provide some level of protection 
for celebrities.  First, it explicitly provides for the registration of personal names.  
Second, Article 16’s exclusive rights prohibit the unauthorized use of a registered name.  
Third, if a defendant appropriates an exact use of the mark, the claimant is not required to 
329 See Alain Lapter, The WTO’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Does the United States Take it 
Seriously? A TRIPs Analysis, 4 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 217 (2005); The World Trade Organization 
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330
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demonstrate consumer confusion.  The ensuing confusion is presumed.  The Article’s 
language also implies that if the claimant can demonstrate an appropriate level of 
consumer confusion, they can prevail even if the defendant did not duplicate the 
trademark, in toto.  For example, assume Michael Jordan owns the trademark to his 
name.  If an advertiser uses the “MICHAEL JORDAN” mark without consent, he is in 
violation of Article 16, regardless of whether consumer confusion exists.  Furthermore, 
even if the advertiser uses the mark “M.J.” to sell basketball shoes, he may remain liable 
if Michael Jordan can prove that the use of those initials to sell basketball apparel is 
misleading and results in confusion as to his implied sponsorship of the product.  
Consequently, TRIPs drafters recognized, though narrowly, the need for a certain level of 
publicity protection because the unabated use of a celebrity’s name has the potential to 
cause severe consumer confusion, which trademark law, at its root, attempts to prevent.
Though Article 15 and 16 protections are not broad enough to encapsulate right of 
publicity, in toto, it does provide evidence that international intellectual property 
negotiators recognize the existence of a problem.  Protection under TRIPs is also 
important because of the dispute resolution mechanism non-existent under Berne.  Unlike 
the WIPO, which has never presided over a copyright infringement claim, the WTO 
enacted a revolutionary dispute resolution mechanism capable of providing effective and 
forceful jurisprudence.  Consequently, the WTO has presided over hundreds of cases 
invoking agreements under their auspices, including several dozen claims alleging 
violation of TRIPs.333
333 See generally Lapter, supra note 329, at Part II.
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D. Multilateral Agreements Conclusion
Currently, no multilateral agreements exist which explicitly protect the right of 
publicity to any certain degree.  Several organizations, ECHR and WIPO, have either a 
limited privacy-based protection or have only proposed a treaty that, in theory, would 
accommodate some publicity rights.  Meanwhile, trademark protection under TRIPs will 
protect one dimension of a celebrity’s persona – his name.  The WTO’s additional benefit 
is the creation of a truly effective dispute resolution mechanism that for the first time 
provides international jurisprudence protecting a celebrity’s name, registered as a 
trademark, against unauthorized commercial use.  
Perhaps the greatest catalyst for a true international right of publicity regime 
would require the intervention of the United States.  As noted, U.S. celebrities are 
marketed on a global scale and misappropriation of their likeness results in losses in the 
millions of dollars.  Akin to the United States’ desire to forge a stronger international 
copyright regime, in order to stifle the billions of dollars lost to global IP piracy, right of 
publicity losses should also serve as an impetus to establish a strong regime.  However, it 
remains difficult to imagine that the United States will promote a harmonized right of 
publicity scheme in the near future.  The obvious obstacle is the fact that the federal 
government remains unwilling to enact even a harmonized right of publicity within its 
own borders.  They have systematically rejected the notion, thereby leaving protection to 
the states.  Consequently, protection may only come through the efforts of a foreign 
nation’s proposal.  
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Part V: Copyright v. Trademark Law – Where does Right of Publicity 
Fit?????
This paper has attempted to establish the current state of right of publicity 
protection in the United States, in several countries on various continents, and on the 
international level.  This survey has unequivocally demonstrated that a harmonized 
universal right of publicity simply does not currently exist, both in its theoretical 
perceptions and in either statutory schemes or jurisprudence.  It has also exposed the 
extreme state of flux and uncertainty in which potential plaintiffs find themselves, 
particularly on the international level.  However, this paper has also attempted to 
highlight the need for such protection because of the harm it can, and has, caused to the 
right-holder, and, perhaps more importantly, the consumer.  
A. Right of Publicity – A Copyright…A Trademark…Not Intellectual At 
All???
In order to promulgate the most efficient and effective solution to producing a 
harmonized international right of publicity statutory scheme, as well as proper remedial 
measures, one needs to consider what avenue of intellectual property this right falls into, 
in any.  As discussed below, both the Copyright and Trademark statutory schemes 
present advantages and disadvantages to the right of publicity, and neither could fully 
incorporate an effective protection scheme without substantial and detailed amendments.
i. Copyright Law
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides for protection of original works of authorship 
that are both fixed in a tangible medium of expression and that “come within the subject 
matter of copyright as specified by Sections 102 and 103.”334  Section 102 puts forth an 
illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of subject matter that includes: literary works; musical 
334
 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
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works; dramatic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; audiovisual works; and, 
sound recordings.335  As such, the indicia of identity that has become synonymous with 
right of publicity protection – name, voice, persona – are not included within this list.  
Therefore, those proprietary aspects would have to be legislatively incorporated into the 
Act or through jurisprudence.
As a preeminent scholar on the right of publicity, Professor Kwall argued that “a 
constructed persona should be considered a “writing” within the meaning of the 
Constitution.”336  Citing the legislative history of the 1976 Act, Prof. Kwall contends that 
the recognition of a persona as a “writing” is a logical and natural expansion beyond its 
meaning to the original framers of the Constitution.337  As Kwall points out, the Supreme 
Court in Goldstein v. California338 stated that the “history of federal copyright statutes 
indicates that the congressional determination to consider specific classes of writings is 
dependent, not only on the character of the writing, but also on the commercial 
importance of the product to the national economy.”339  In essence, the Court held that 
Congress has broad discretion when deciding what is to be considered a “writing”.340
Taking this broad grant of authority, coupled with the “Americans love to model 
celebrities’ buying patterns,”341  Kwall argues that the consumer culture in which we live 
justifies the “support for recognizing constructed personas as writings for the purpose of 
copyright law.”342
335
 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
336
 Kwall, supra note 318, at 160.
337 Id. at 160-161.
338
 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
339
 Kwall, supra note 318, at 161 (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, at 562 (1973).
340
 Kwall, supra note 318, at 161.
341 Id. at 162.
342 Id.
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However, Prof. Kwall’s insightful position would undoubtedly present significant 
pragmatic issues.  First, a persona is quite different than a computer program, or other 
“writing”, not found explicitly under Section 102 or originally envisioned by the Framers.  
Unlike a true “writing”, which any party can perceive one way or another because it is 
“fixed on a tangible medium of expression”, as required under the 1976 Act, a “persona” 
is wholly amorphous and ambiguous.  How would a celebrity quantify their persona in 
court, or much less register it with the copyright office?  A “writing” is also something 
that does not change.  Once it is put down in writing, it exists as is.  Even if the author 
amends the original or produces derivative works, the original will most likely always 
exist and will always be perceptible, as such.  However, personas are naturally bound to 
change over time.  Therefore, if copyright law would recognize a persona as a “writing”, 
thereby granting it the statutory length of protection, and, thereafter the persona no longer 
exists, would such protection also cease?  A “writing”, as envisioned by the Framers, as 
well as Congress, involves a tangible writing that does not mutate or cease to exist, 
regardless of the amount of revisions, adaptations or derivatives.  The underlying work 
will always remain.  The same can not be said for a celebrity’s persona, which, arguably, 
evolves and vacillates throughout their careers.
Prof. Kwall’s argument would also require a complete departure from numerous 
federal cases unequivocally holding that “[A] person’s person does not fall with in the 
subject matter of copyright – it does not consist of “a ‘writing’ of an ‘author’ within the 
meaning of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.”343  As for Midler, the fact that her 
343 Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, at 658 (5th Cir. 2000); 1 Melville B Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT §1.01[B][1][C]; Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D.N.J. 1993); Bi-Rite 
Enterprises, Inc.  v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Apigram Publishing Co. v. 
Factors, Etc., Inc., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9738, 1980 WL 2047 (N.D.Ohio July 30, 1980).  
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“vocal style” was not considered “fixed” by the Ninth Circuit, and, therefore, did not 
come under the purview of the 1976 Act, was critical to her right of publicity claim 
because if it had, her publicity claim would have been preempted by Section 301 of the 
Copyright Act.  Underlining the inherent evolution of a persona, the court in Midler 
further reasoned that “[a] voice is as distinctive and personal as a face.”344  Inherently, a 
voice, as well as a face continually goes through changes.  These mutations further 
undercut the contention that a persona can be included as a “writing” under the 1976 Act 
because of the impossibility of tangibly identifying the indicia, unless it is captured in a 
photograph or recording – both explicitly protected under the 1976 Act.  
Protection under copyright laws does present several distinct advantages.  First, 
copyright law does not discriminate between the famous and non-famous.  Any person 
can gain protection under the 1976 Act so long as they produce an original work of 
authorship in a tangible medium of expression.  Of course, with such broad protection 
comes the potential for problems.  First, if we were to protect someone’s “persona” under 
copyright law, we would, in essence, be granting everyone an exclusive right over their 
indicia of identity for life plus seventy years.  It is easy to imagine the chaos this would 
cause in litigation.  How can one person justify or quantify that they should be the sole 
holders of a persona?  How can someone prove that in court?  
A further complication would reside in the protection of names.  In the United 
States alone there are over 2500 people named “Michael Lewis”.345  If copyright were to 
grant an exclusive use to someone’s persona, regardless of fame of further proof of 
344 Midler, 849 F.2d 460, at 463.
345
 Nationwide Yahoo people search for the name Michael Lewis, available at
http://phone.people.yahoo.com/py/psPhoneSearch.py?srch=bas&D=1&FirstName=michael&LastName=le
wis&City=&State=&Phone=&Search=Phone+and+Address+Search 
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source identification, which of these people deserve to hold and enforce such protection?  
Even if famousness were a requirement under copyright law, an issue would exist.  
Should the Michael Lewis who plays for the Philadelphia Eagles become the sole right-
holder or the Michael Lewis who plays for the New Orleans Saints?  Or should protection 
be given to the Michael Lewis who works as a trademark examining attorney at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office?  As one can easily imagine, extending 
existing copyright laws to include all indicia of identity, currently protected through 
jurisprudence and state laws would create a tidal wave of litigation.  Therefore, even 
though the 1976 Act is superior in that it protects ALL authors, instead of solely the 
famous, such all-encompassing protection will create severe problems.  
Another advantage of the copyright system is that protection is limited to life of 
the right-holder plus seventy years.  Although, this author is certain that the trustees of 
Elvis Presley’s estate would vehemently disagree, the right to protect one’s name and 
image should terminate at some point after the holder’s death.  A person’s name, 
likeness, persona, singing style, or other indicia of identity simply should not be protected 
in perpetuity, if such underlying protection is based on proprietary protection and 
economic exploitation of such characteristic.  However, if the justification for the right of 
publicity is predicated on consumer protection, one can make a stronger case for 
perpetual rights.  Yet it is difficult to imagine a scenario where consumers would become 
duped by a false endorsement from a celebrity who died a century ago.  All intellectual 
property expires at some point of another.  Even trademarks, which fundamentally protect 
consumers from fraud, are perceptible to abandonment and cancellation based on non-
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use.  Publicity rights should be no different.  Therefore, the strict time limitations under 
the Copyright Act may provide the proper framework.  
ii. Trademark Law
Unlike Copyright law that has only been mentioned in passing as a possible 
avenue of protection for publicity rights, trademark law has been the focus of several 
proposals for federal protection.  Although many argue that right of publicity protection 
is a natural fit as a subset of trademark law, the current federal trademark protection 
scheme would create significant issues including the length of protection, as well as 
registration and use of the mark requirements.
Several years ago, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and the International 
Trademark Association (“INTA”) advanced the most ambitious undertaking regarding 
the federalization of publicity rights.  Although both were ultimately unsuccessful, the 
proposals would have called for an expansion of the Lanham Act to include “persona” 
rights.  The INTA’s proposal would treat publicity rights, defined as “persona” rights in 
their proposed amendment, as trademarks.346
The INTA suggested an amendment to Section 45 of the Lanham Act that would 
define “persona” as:
"persona" means the following or an imitation thereof: the legal name of any 
natural person or any other name by which a natural person is known to any 
material segment of the general public; signature; voice; image; distinctive 
characteristics or appurtences by which a natural person is known to any material 
segment of the general public; or a character portrayed by the natural person on 
stage, in film or television or in live performances or other entertainment media, 
provided that the character has been created by the natural person and has become 
so associated with the natural person as to be indistinguishable from the natural 
person as to be indistinguishable from the natural person’s public image.
346
 O. Yale Lewis Jr., Personality, Persona, and Publicity Rights (1997), available at
http://www.hllaw.com/a_personality.html.
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(1) The term "image" includes, but is not limited to, a picture, portrait, likeness, 
photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape or live 
television transmission or audio/visual representation or any analog or digital 
representation or transmission or any other method of crating or reproducing a 
likeness, now know or hereafter created, such that the natural person is readily 
identifiable.
(2) A natural person shall be deemed to be "readily identifiable" from an image 
when one who views the image with the naked eye can reasonably determine that 
it is such natural person depicted in the image.347
Registration and exploitation of persona rights would be required.  In addition, and unlike 
copyright protection, persona protection under the INTA proposal would be renewable at 
ten-year intervals, indefinitely, and would be freely transferable and descendible.
Although a profound proposal and one that would finally bring publicity rights in 
a federal protection scheme and, thus, create harmonization from among the menagerie of 
state laws, several keys problems would persist under this legislation.  First, depending 
on how the courts define and interpret the exploitation requirement, artists like Tom 
Waits may find themselves shut out from federal protection simply because they refuse to 
extend the commercialization of their persona.  If courts interpret the wording liberally, 
Waits’ musical recordings and sales thereof would provide sufficient exploitation of his 
voice to garner protection against any form of unauthorized use, regardless of product.  
However, a narrow reading of the statute’s language may provide him protection only for 
certain types of exploitation.  In essence, if an actor uses his image to endorse clothing, 
he would only get protection from unauthorized appropriation in that specific field of 
goods.  If so, this would become a distinct disadvantage to artists like Waits who 
universally rejects endorsement proposals.  The system would, in essence, require artists 
to exploit their persona, regardless of personal choice.  
347 Id.
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Second, the system may become problematic in its registration requirements.  
Currently, a trademark applicant is required to select a class of goods or services for 
which they intend to use the trademark.  There currently exist forty-five (45) international 
classes and the applicant is required to submit separate filing fees for each class for which 
they seek protection.348  Would artists be required to select a certain class of goods and/or 
services when they register for trademark protection?  If the proposed amendment would 
require “persona” applicant’s to select classes of goods and services for which they seek 
protection, does that permit free-riders to fraudulently use that applicant’s persona on 
goods or services for which they did not apply?  The problem arises in that artists who 
wish to avoid potential consumer confusion would, in actuality, have to register for every 
class, a costly proposition.349  Intrinsically, there exists a major difference between a 
normal trademark, with literal and/or design elements, and a trademark consisting of 
someone’s persona.  Under contemporary trademark law, two different owners can 
register the identical mark, so long as the mark is being used on sufficiently different 
goods and/or services.350  These marks can co-exist because consumers would not in all 
likelihood confuse the source of the goods.  Consumers would not believe that Delta 
Airlines also produces piping, and vice-versa.  However, the same can not be said for a 
celebrity’s persona.  Whether a third party uses Bette Midler’s voice or image to sell cars, 
t-shirts, financial services or chemicals, consumers will recognize the voice as emanating 
348
 Basic Facts about Trademarks, US Patent and Trademark Office, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/doc/basic/.
349
 US PTO Fee Schedule, US Patent and Trademark Office, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2006apr05.htm#tm.
350
 The mark DELTA, by itself, is registered 83 times on the Principal Register at the US Patent and 
Trademark Office, many times for different goods and services and by different owners.  See Registration 
Nos. 3032456 for flow meters, 2836460 for management of domain names, 2790443 for hand tools, 
2824774 for medical gloves, 2519490 for laboratory equipment, 1454459 for snow skies, among many 
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from only one source and will likely, yet falsely, believe that Midler endorses that 
product. 
Third, a federal trademark would, theoretically, grant the right-holder perpetual 
protection over the marks.  Although this author assumes that most celebrities would 
enthusiastically endorse such rights, with time it would also begin to defeat the 
underlying purpose of trademark law as a consumer protection scheme.  At its core, 
trademark law grants applicants the unilateral right to use a source identifier on products 
and services in order to protect consumers by ensuring them that products and services 
come from the source indicated.  Otherwise, what is to stop 20 other producers of soda to 
stick the mark COKE on their goods?  Perpetual protection is granted because consumers 
today or in 100 years from now want the assurance that the COKE they buy on store 
shelves is actually manufactured by the Coca-Cola Corporation.  Of course, if this 
corporation ceases to exist, the mark is considered cancelled because of abandonment 
and, thereafter, can be claimed on a first-come-first-serve basis.  However, the situation is 
different for celebrities in the sense that consumers are not apt to assume that the 
celebrity whose name or image appears on the product actually manufactures the good.  
Consumers are likely to believe that the celebrity is simply endorsing the good or service.  
Based on that assumption, perpetual protection is unnecessary some period of time 
following the celebrity’s death.  If a perfume called “Essence by Marilyn Monroe” was to 
come on the market today, would consumers actually view the mark as a source identifier 
in that Marilyn Monroe actually endorsed the product?  It is hard to fathom that the 
typical consumer would make this determination.  Furthermore, even if the product is 
manufactured by the celebrity or with the celebrity’s input, this author argues that that 
107
person’s death is analogous to Coca-Cola going out of business and having their mark 
cancel through abandonment.  
This author does posit that some period of protection must exist for celebrity 
persona marks beyond that individual’s death because a celebrity’s established goodwill 
and reputation does not simply evaporate at time of death.  The goodwill certainly 
continues to exist, especially if products bearing that person’s name remain in the 
marketplace.  This suggestion would also strike a balance between the two main 
justifications for right of publicity protection: economic protection as a property right and 
as a consumer protection device.  Judge Howell, in Allen v. National Video, stated that 
the Act extended to the protection of a celebrity’s “commercial investment in the drawing 
power of his or her name and face in endorsing products and in marketing a career…The 
underlying purposes of the Lanham Act…appear to be implicated in cases of 
misrepresentations regarding the endorsement of goods and services.”351  However, over 
time this persona would naturally lose value as a source identifier to the point that it 
becomes nothing more than a cosmetic addition to any mark.  Furthermore, any 
protection beyond the point of source identification would undermine the purpose of the 
Lanham Act, morphing protection justifications from consumer-centric to one based on a 
proprietary right in the economic value of a persona.  
For example, in the 1950s the mark CHARLIE CHAPLIN for walking canes 
would most likely create an implication that Charlie Chaplin had some connection with 
the goods, especially since his canes became intricately linked to his persona.  However, 
use of the same mark in 2005 would create a completely different commercial 
impression.  One where a consumer would not assume that Chaplin endorsed the canes or 
351 Allen v. National Video, 610 F. Supp. 612, at 625-626 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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helped in their manufacture, but perhaps that the canes is styled after those that the actor 
used in his films.  This example demonstrates that the significance of a celebrity’s name 
as a source identifier changes and weakens.  Therefore, perpetual protection for a mark 
that no longer functions as a source indicator is counter to the underlying objective of 
trademark law.  Based on this argument, this author would recommend that any right of 
publicity protection instilled within the Lanham Act be protected for the duration of the 
mark-holder’s life plus 50 years. 
Part VI. Solution
This section tries to develop a harmonized statutory scheme that would 
incorporate the over-arching aspects of contemporary right of publicity laws, while also 
trying to infuse international ideology and doctrine.  It is inconceivable to produce 
language that would wholly and seamlessly integrate all viewpoints, statutory language 
and jurisprudence, regardless of validity.  However, the author believes that symmetrical 
statutory language could accommodate the majority of existing laws, without drastically 
altering or eliminating current protections and expectations.  
A. Statutory Solution
As discussed above, both copyright law and trademark law have advantages and 
disadvantages when it comes to publicity protection.  Perhaps the main difference 
between copyright and trademark is the underlying justifications for protection; economic 
expectations versus consumer protection and unfair competition, respectively.  However, 
in light of international jurisprudence and statutes relating to the right of publicity, such 
protection must be perceived as protecting consumers against deceptive use of another’s 
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source identifier, and, therefore belongs under the trademark umbrella.  It should also be 
noted that although the stated purpose of trademark law is consumer-centric, individuals 
and companies also obtain marks for their economic and proprietary value, coupled with 
the perpetual monopolistic protection granted under the Lanham Act.  Accordingly, this 
section will promulgate a protection scheme through a quasi-piecemeal approach that will 
incorporate both statutory and court-created laws.
The new integrated international statute, incorporated within the TRIPs Agreement, as 
discussed below, is proposed as follows:
SECTION 9: RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Article 1
Protectable Subject Matter
1. Any Persona or Image of the Registrant capable of registration.  
a. "Persona" means the following or an imitation thereof: the legal name of 
any natural person or any other name by which a natural person is known 
to any material segment of the general public; signature; voice; image; 
distinctive characteristics or appurtences by which a natural person is 
known to any material segment of the general public; or a character 
portrayed by the natural person on stage, in film or television or in live 
performances or other entertainment media, provided that the character 
has been created by the natural person and has become so associated with 
the natural person as to be indistinguishable from the natural person as to 
be indistinguishable from the natural person’s public image.
b. "Image" includes, but is not limited to, a picture, portrait, likeness, 
photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any 
videotape or live television transmission or audio/visual representation or 
any analog or digital representation or transmission or any other method of 
crating or reproducing a likeness, now know or hereafter created, such that 
the natural person is readily identifiable.352
2. Members may make registrability of a Persona or Image dependent on actual use 
of the Persona or Image.  However, actual use of a Persona or Image shall not be 
a condition for filing an application for registration.  An application shall not be 
352
 Lewis, supra note 346.
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refused solely on the ground that intended use has not taken place before the 
expiry of a period of three years from the date of the application.353
3. Members may make registrability of a Persona or Image dependent on evidence 
of acquired distinctiveness acquired through use. 
4. The nature of the goods or services to which registration in a Persona or Image is 
to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the Persona or 
Image unless the nature of the goods or services, as enumerated in the application, 
would violate criminal or civil statutes of the Member issuing the registration.354
a. Individuals need not identify specific goods or services for which they are 
seeking protection.  Individuals will receive protection for all goods and 
services for the duration of the protection period.
5. Members shall publish each application for a Persona or Image before it is 
registered and shall afford a reasonable opportunity for petitions to oppose to 
either cancel or narrow the registration.  In addition, Members may afford an 
opportunity for the Registration of a Persona or Image to be opposed.355
Rights Conferred
1. The Registrant shall have the exclusive right to prevent third parties not having 
the owner’s consent from —
a. using in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation of a registrant’s Persona or Image in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on 
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
b. reproducing, counterfeiting, coping, or colorably imitating a Registrant’s 
Persona or Image and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, 
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or 
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising 
of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive356
2. Rights conferred are dependent on the valid and live registration of a Persona or 
Image within a Member’s registry.  
Term of Protection
1. “Initial Period of Protection” - Rights in Persona and Image shall last for the 
lifetime of the Registrant plus a period of fifty (50) years after the death of the 
Registrant.357
353 See TRIPs, sec. 2, art. 15(3), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
354 See TRIPs, sec. 2, art. 15(4), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
355 See TRIPs, sec. 2, art. 15(5), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
356 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114 (2006).
357 See generally, Tenn. Code Ann. 47-25-1104(a).
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2. Following the Initial Period of Protection, rights are subject to abandonment and 
cancellation in goods or services on which the Persona or Image have not been 
commercially exploited for a period of two consecutive years.358
3. The right-holder will retain protection on goods or services on which the Persona 
or Image is in use, so long as that holder does not fail to commercially exploit that 
such Persona or Image, in any acceptable form, on such goods and services for a 
period of two consecutive years.  Rights to use the Persona or Image on goods or 
services for which it was never commercially exploited during Initial Period of 
Protection or not exploited on goods or services for two consecutive years are 
subject to a cancellation immediately succeeding the termination of the fifty-year 
period following the original Registrant’s death.  
4. Circumstances arising independently from the will of the right-holder in Persona 
or Image that constitute a bona fide obstacle to the use of the Persona or Image 
shall be recognized as valid reasons for non-use.  Such reasons will not serve as a 
bar to cancellation for goods or services on which the Persona or Image had not 
been commercially exploited during the Initial Period of Protection.359
Transferability and Descendability
1. Rights in Persona and Image vest in the right-holder regardless of whether such 
rights were commercially exploited during that individual’s lifetime by either that 
individual or a licensee or assignee.  Rights in Persona or Image shall be deemed 
exclusive to the individual, or licensee or assignee of such rights, for the full 
duration of such rights as protected under this statute.
2. The individual rights provided for in this statute are considered property rights 
and are freely assignable and licensable.360
3. Rights in Persona and Image constitute rights in property and are freely and 
wholly or severally transferable by any means or testamentary instrument during 
the right-holder’s lifetime or by the successors-in-interest for the duration of the 
period of protection under this statute.  
4. Under no circumstance will the period of protection be extended beyond the 
statutory provision, regardless of testamentary or contractual agreements.
Exceptions
1. Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a registration 
for a Persona or Image, such as fair use and newsworthiness, provided that such 
exceptions take account of the legitimate interests, economical and proprietary, of 
the right-holder and third parties.  Exceptions must also take into account the 
public’s interest in avoiding consumer confusion as it relates to the endorsement 
of goods and/or services.
358 Id.
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2. Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the Persona or 
Image and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right-
holder.361
3. In no way will exceptions hinder a third-party’s right to use a Persona or Image 
when used in association with: criticism, comment, teaching, News Reporting, 
scholarship or research. 
a. “News reporting” means a medium that publishes, broadcasts, or 
disseminates information in the normal course of business including, but 
not limited to the Internet, newspapers, magazines, radio and television.362
B. Remedial Solution
In this author’s opinion, any international agreement requires a definitive and 
effective dispute resolution mechanism with a resolute enforcement mechanism.  
Otherwise, the words of the page are simply nothing more than window dressing, without 
any real requirements to adhere to those provisions or incorporate them into national law.  
Consequently, a proper and complete harmonized right of publicity agreement will 
require a dispute resolution mechanism that would substantially protect the right holder.
To that end, this author would propose that the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”), and in particular the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects in Intellectual
Property, may be the most appropriate authority to promulgate, administer and enforce 
any harmonized international agreement on right of publicity.  The WTO is clearly 
advantageous, unlike any agreement under the auspices of the United Nations, because of
its dispute resolution provisions that create an effective and enforceable remedial 
solution.363
However, the requirements for obtaining judicial review under the WTO can 
create certain roadblocks for potential plaintiffs.  Particularly, the WTO does not permit 
361 See TRIPs, sec. 1, art. 13, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
362 See Goodman, supra note 116, at 277 (citing Ind. Code 32-13-1-4 (now 32-36-1-4)).
363 See generally Lapter, supra note 329.
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individuals to bring claims before the dispute resolution panel.  Only Member-States are 
permitted to bring claims, which would require an individual right-holder to petition it’s 
country’s State Department, or similar government agency, to take the case before the 
WTO.364  It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which a country would 
entertain the idea of bringing a claim in the WTO against another Member-State on 
behalf of just one individual.  There are simply more important issues than one person’s 
grievance.  Of course, two other viable avenues of recourse exist.  First, any right of 
publicity agreement would require Member-States to implement such rights into its 
national law.  Therefore, the right-holder has the option of bringing a claim in that 
particular State.  
Second, a State may be more willing to entertain and bring a claim before the 
WTO if multiple right-holders felt aggrieved, and advocated for a joint claim.  This 
scenario recently occurred between the European Union and the United States in regards 
to the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (“FMLA”).365  There, although a claim that the 
United States was obviating from its copyright requirements under TRIPs was originally 
brought to light by a group of Irish musicians, the EU decided to bring the case before the 
WTO after a group of musicians brought identical petitions.366  Therefore, if the Motion 
Picture Association of America brings forth a petition on behalf of numerous celebrities 
and claims that China’s laws permit unabated persona infringements that result in 
substantial economic losses and endangers the individuals’ reputation and commercial 
value of their name and image, it is conceivable that the United States would entertain the 
action.  
364 Id. at 227.
365 See generally, Lapter, supra note 329, 238-250.
366 Id.
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It is certainly understandable that an international body, administering intellectual 
property rights, would not permit individual standing before its dispute resolution 
mechanism.  Therefore, even though individual actions would require extensive travel 
and local counsel costs, in that the claim would have to be brought before national courts, 
it is certainly more sensible than the alternative.  In short, regardless of the method 
through which persona rights are harmonized and guaranteed, the international body 
administering the agreement must also incorporate an effective mechanism to resolve 
disputes.  By such a measure, it would create overwhelming disincentives for countries to 
simply disregard the provisions because of either national interests or lack of 
enforcement.
Part VII. Conclusion
The comparison of multiple foreign legal models is “needed now more than ever 
because of the expansion of international transactions; the globalization of legal culture; 
and the movements for unification, federation, and law reform around the world.”367  This 
is no different than with the right of publicity since the global “merchandising” of 
celebrities, and, in particular, those residing in the United States have grown 
significantly.  Consequently, using Midler as a backdrop, this paper’s overall aim was to 
survey the existence, if any, of right of publicity protection schemes throughout the 
world.  In addition, this paper attempted to put forth a viable regulatory scheme that 
would, not only represent the differing views on publicity protection, but also finally 
367
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recognize the problem of divergent regulatory schemes and, therefore, create an 
acceptable, and much needed, solution.
Satellite television and broadband Internet have provided mediums that give 
advertisers the ability to simultaneously disseminate advertisements on a global scale.  
This technology, coupled with the intrinsic value of a celebrity’s persona, makes for a 
lethal combination that without effective protection measures will systematically strip 
him of any real marketable value to his name or likeness.  Consequently, a 
comprehensive and harmonized international right of publicity is not only necessary in 
the digital age, but the only effective and equitable means of protection.  Without such 
legislation, advertisers will have free reign to alienate an individual from his most 
precious property…himself.
